











Münchener Beiträge  
zur Politikwissenschaft 
 










Building Peace With Conflict 
Resources? Analysing The 
Impact Of The Management of 
Resource Concessions For 
Good Governance In Post-
Conflict Liberia And The 





Bachelorarbeit bei  
Dr. Lars C. Colschen  




1. Introduction: Natural Resources, Civil War And The Relevance To Elaborate The Role Of Natural 
Resources For Post- Conflict Peacebuilding........................................................................................1
2. The Framework Of Analysis: Defining The Key Concepts And Presenting The Debates In The 
Literature. An Overview.......................................................................................................................5
2.1 Defining Natural Resources ......................................................................................................5
2.2 Defining Conflict Resources......................................................................................................5
2.3 The Concept Of Peacebuilding..................................................................................................6
2.4 The Concept Of Good Governance............................................................................................7
2.5 The Debates Around Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Good Governance And Natural Resources 
And Natural Resource Management................................................................................................8
3. Evaluation Of The Governmental Management Of Resource Concessions Fostering Good 
Governance In Post-Conflict Liberia And The Democratic Republic Of The Congo........................12
3.1 The Principles Of Good Governance: Legitimacy, Transparency And The Sharing of Benefits
.......................................................................................................................................................13
3.2 Analysing The Case Of Post- Conflict Liberia........................................................................16
3.2.1 The Liberian Context: Civil War, Conflict Resources And The Way To A Post- Conflict 
State...........................................................................................................................................17
3.2.2 The Post- Conflict Governmental Review, Renegotiation And Cancellation Process Of 
Natural Resource Concessions..................................................................................................18
3.2.3 Evaluation Of The Impact Of Resource Concessions For Good Governance.................22
3.3 Analysing The Case Of Post- Conflict Democratic Republic Of The Congo..........................26
3.3.1 The Congolese Context: Civil War, Conflict Resources And The Way To A Post-Conflict 
State...........................................................................................................................................26
3.3.2 The Post- Conflict Governmental Review, Renegotiation And Cancellation Process Of 
Natural Resource Concessions..................................................................................................29
3.3.3 Evaluation Of The Impact Of Resource Concessions For Good Governance.................33
4. Conclusion: Management Of Resource Concessions As A Mean To Foster Good Governance And 
Peacebuilding. Comparing The Two Cases Of Post- Conflict Liberia And The Democratic Republic 
Of The Congo.....................................................................................................................................37
Appendix I Environmental Opportunities For Peacebuilding Arranged By OECD 
Peacebuilding Pillars (UNEP 2009)......…..…................................................40
Appendix II The Five UNDP- Principles Of Good Governance (Graham et al. 2003).......41
Bibliography ….....................................................................................................................42
List of Acronyms
ADF Allied Democratic Forces
AFDL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
ANEP National Association of Public Companies
ArcelorMittal Mittal Steel Holdings N.V.
CCRC (Liberia's) Contracts and Concessions Review Committee 
CENCO Congolese National Bishop's Conference
CEPAS “Centre d'études pour l'action sociale”
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ELI Environmental Law Institute
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FAZ Zairian National Army 
FEC Federation of Congolese Enterprises
FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
Firestone Firestone Natural Rubber Company LLC 
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program for 
Liberia
ICD Inter-Congolese Dialogue
IMCC Inter Ministerial Concession Committee (of Liberia)
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ISLP International Senior Lawyers Project
LRA Lord's Resistance Army
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDA Mineral Development Agreement
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
NALU National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NGO Non- Governmental Organization
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRGI Natural Resource Governance Institute
NRM Natural Resource Management
NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia
OSISA Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
PCNRM Post- conflict Natural Resource Management
PPCC (Liberia's) Public Procurement and Concessions Commission
REDD+ Reducing Emissions  from Deforestation and forest  Degradation in  
Developing Countries
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUF Revolutionary United Front
TAI Transparency and Accountability Initiative 
ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UPDF Uganda People's Defence Force
WTO World Trade Organisation 
1. Introduction: Natural Resources, Civil War And The Relevance To Elaborate The 
Role Of Natural Resources For Post- Conflict Peacebuilding
Natural resources can be a blessing or a curse for states, its people and their peace. But especially in 
Africa, many countries are not profiting from their natural resource wealth, but struggling with 
violence and war. „Our nation is blessed with an endowment rich in natural [...] resources. Yet, our 
economy  has  collapsed  due  to  the  several  civil  conflicts  and  economic  mismanagement  by 
successive  governments”  stated  the  President  of  Liberia  Ellen-Johnson Sirleaf  in  her  inaugural 
Speech in January 2006 (Sirleaf  2006). Liberia is just one example of a state, experiencing this 
paradox of resource wealth and civil war. Hence there have been several debates in the literature of 
political science around natural resources and war within a country. 
Continuing through the 1990s the resource curse thesis was founded by Richard Auty. He sought to 
prove that natural resource wealth more often leads to poor economic development and usually 
results in “bad“ social and political outcomes, like civil wars, than in resource deficient countries. 
There are several examples, which support the argument, that natural resources are often fuelling 
civil war and bad governance rather than creating prosperity for the benefits of all people (Auty 
1993). This strand of scholars focus on abundance of and dependency on natural resources or the 
resource curse1 or paradox of the plenty2 as a central factor for civil war (e.g. Auty 1993; Karl 1997; 
Collier/Hoeffler  1998).  In  contrast,  early  research  around  violent  conflict  and  the  environment 
including natural resources was focusing on scarcity as a possible driver for conflict. Especially 
when these disputes over access of limited resources occur around divided social lines, such as 
religion, class and ethnicity (Frerks et al. 2014: 21). But further research could not find a direct link  
between scarcity or environmental degradation and violent conflict (Conca/ Wallace 2009: 488). 
These debates have occurred since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War alongside several empiric 
observations that the characteristics of war had changed. Wars are broader proliferated over the 
whole world, and the majority of wars are taking place in the developing  countries (Bruch et al. 
2009).  Further,  the  dynamics  of  warfare  have  also  changed.  This  development  drove  several 
scholars to a new concept, underlining new dynamics of war: 'from old wars to new wars' (Duffield 
2001; Kaldor 2001; Münkler 2005). The majority of wars are now intrastate than interstate wars and 
1 The concept of resource curse was introduced by Richard M. Auty 1993. “At its broadest, the phrase resource curse 
refers not only to poor economic development, but also to other negative political and social outcomes that have 
been associated with abundant natural resources, including detachment from the electorate and increased risk of 
armed conflict” (Rustad/Lujala 2012: 8, fn. 7).
2 The phenomenon of the paradox of the plenty was named by Terry Lynn Karl in 1997, demonstrating especially why 
the performance of governments of oil-rich countries has often disappointing development outcomes. For more see 
Karl (1997).
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consequently, 'new' actors are fighting for power over the state. In most cases, these players consist  
of a state actor and one or more non-state actors, like rebel or separatist groups. This shift not only 
has several implications for the impact of war on civilians, but also the environment and its funding. 
Because  the  civil  war  takes  place  within  countries  borders,  battles  often  happen  in  the  whole 
territory and therefore intrastate wars harm more civilians (Bruch et al. 2009: 58, 59). This is not 
only impacting the increasing number of  civilian deaths  or violence against  them, but  also the 
destruction of their livelihoods and the environment (Young/ Goldman 2015: 2).
Even though there is no consent in the literature regarding the role resources play in a civil war, 
there are three major relations between natural resources and intrastate wars (UNEP 2009). Firstly, 
grievances, like the unequal distribution of natural resources and benefits or negative impacts of 
resource exploitation,  can  directly increase the  risk of  conflict  (Rustad/  Lujala  2012:  7;  UNEP 
2009). Focusing on this aspect there was a widespread debate in the literature whether greed, the 
“profitable opportunities” for rebellion (Collier/Hoeffler 2004: 564) or grievance can be a driver of 
violent intrastate conflict. Second, there is some evidence that the (illegal) exploitation of natural 
resources,  on  both  combatant  sides  as  a  mean  to  fund  the  war,  sustains  and  prolongs  battle 
(Nietzschke/  Studdard 2005).  Thirdly,  some individual  actors might  hollow out the prospect  of 
peace, because these so called 'peace spoilers' do not want to lose access to natural resources and 
their revenues (UNEP 2009: 11;  Rustad/ Binningsbø 2012). This goes along with the finding that 
the  prospect  of  personal  enrichment  through the  exploitation  of  natural  resources  can  be  a 
motivation to start rebellion or to join a rebellion movement (Rustad/ Lujala 2012: 8). 
In the recent debate there is an emerging consensus:
“The environment and associated factors like environmental degradation, resource scarcity and more 
recently climate change, do or may play a role in the rise and continuation of conflict, but are seldom 
the only or most important factor” (Frerks et al. 2014: 17). 
Further,  there  is  consensus  that  there  is  a  connection  between  natural  resources  and  civil  war 
(Töpfer 2012). Several findings suggest that at least 40% of all civil wars since the end of the Cold 
War  are  associated  with  natural  resources,  like  high-value  natural  resources,  such  as  oil,  gas, 
minerals, gemstones and timber (UNEP 2009: 8). The United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) underlined that civil wars associated with natural resources are twice as likely to relapse 
into conflict again, within the first five years (UNEP 2009: 5).
But why are so many resource- rich countries not able to achieve a long lasting peace and what can 
be  done?  As  shown,  a  vast  of  literature  is  centred  on  the  connection  of  civil  war  and natural 
resources. However, regarding the consequence of a link between civil war and natural resources 
for  post-conflict peace, the scientific debate is still  in early stages, but growing.  The UNEP for 
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example, began a wide research on this issue, suggesting starting points to include natural resources 
in the principles of post- conflict peacebuilding. Accordingly, the offered pillars of opportunities to 
integrate  natural  resources in peacebuilding are “Supporting Economic Recovery”,  “Developing 
Sustainable Livelihoods” and to incorporate natural resources into “Dialogue, Confidence Building 
and  Cooperation” (UNEP 2009:  31)3.  But there  remains  a  lack  of  knowledge  and  consensus 
regarding  how the  foundations  for  a  long  lasting  peace  and  development  after  those  conflicts 
associated with conflict resources4 could be built (Conca/ Wallace 2009: 486). Although, a growing 
body of scholars are acknowledging that well managed natural resources might strengthen peace, 
„we still know very little about how such reforms are shaping postconflict peacebuilding“ (Beevers 
2010: 3). Hence, it is highly relevant to provide further research in the field of the incorporation of 
conflict resources for building peace. 
For the purpose of this study, the focus should lay especially on the good governance dimension of 
peacebuilding. Hence based on the UNEP data5, the question of the following study will be: 
“To what extent is the management of resource concessions fostering legitimacy, transparency and  
sharing of benefits in post- conflict Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as  
principles of good governance?”
The management of resource concessions entails the allocation and management of existing and 
future concessions and their compliance (African Development Bank Group 2014: 18). However, 
the focus of the following work will  be on the review, renegotiation or cancellation process of 
(existing)  natural  resource  -  especially  mining-  concessions  awarded  during  civil  war  or  the 
transitional period. Hence, not aspects of their implementation nor the establishment of regulation 
policies will be analysed.  As a matter of this study, the concentration will focus on the national, 
governmental reappraisal process of resource concessions, rather than processes started by NGOs or 
other international actors.
The management of existing and new natural resource concessions can be difficult, especially in 
post- conflict states. Several risks, like the presence of corruption, a lack of capacities and the eager  
to  jump-start  the  economy,  might  make  it  difficult  to  promote  a  sustainable  and  efficient 
management of concessions (Le Billon 2012: 71). 
„However, failure to adequately address processes related to exploration, exploitation rights, contracts  
and concessions can deprive the state of a considerable amount of revenue, fuel corruption, cause 
unnecessary environmental damage and undermine the state's legitimacy- all of which can undermine 
postwar economic recovery and general peacebuilding“ (Rustad et al. 2013). 
That  is  why it  is  relevant  to  analyse  the  management  of  concessions  in  the  context  of  good 
3 See Appendix I.
4 For the definition of conflict resources, see in the following, page 5.
5 See Appendix I. 
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governance and peacebuilding. This question of analysis should be determined through qualitative 
empiric- analytical method, and concluding in comparing the two cases. 
As a consequence it  is  relevant  for the scientific  debate to generate  new knowledge about the 
management of resource concessions fostering aspects of good governance for peacebuilding, and 
analysing the similarities and differences of the processes in post- conflict Liberia and DRC. 
Now to the explanation on how the cases are chosen. First,  both civil wars, in Liberia (between 
1989- 2003) and the in  DRC (between 1996-97 and 1998-2003, especially the second war) are 
highly associated with conflict resources and are thus have a similar historical relation of natural 
resources and conflict6. Furthermore, these two cases are chosen because Liberia is seen as a good 
example of the management of resource concessions in a post conflict environment, whereas the 
DRC is seen as an example on the other end. “Liberia provides an example of relatively successful 
reappraisal and renegotiation, but this was not the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo“ 
(Le Billon 2012: 75). Therefore it is highly relevant to analyse both of these concession reappraisal 
processes from a good governance perspective and examine to what extent the principles of good 
governance could be fostered through the processes. It is also of interest for political scientists to 
figure out the similarities and differences of managing these concessions and therefore find in future 
research possible conditions for fostering good governance through the management of such. 
Turning now to the thesis structure, the first section will outline the framework of analysis. Firstly, 
key terms relevant for this elaboration, like the definition of natural and conflict resources, and the 
recent scientific  debates discussing good governance,  peacebuilding,  natural resources and their 
management will be presented. In addition, the principles of good governance will be demonstrated 
(Chapter 2). Following that, in Chapter 3 the centre of analysis will be on the case studies Liberia 
and the DRC. Firstly, the for this study relevant three principles of good governance- legitimacy, 
transparency and sharing  of  benefits  will  be  defined and adopted.  Then,  the  Liberian  war  and 
context, with focus on the impact of conflict resources is summed up in order to analyse in the next 
step how the reappraisal process of resource concessions fostered good governance. Following the 
Liberian case,  firstly the  case of  DRC's  civil  war  and connection to  conflict  resources  will  be 
6 As the UNEP (2009: 11) suggests, recent civil wars and internal unrest fuelled by natural resources: The Liberian 
civil war between 1989 and 2003 was fuelled  by  the  natural resources  Timber, diamonds, iron, palm oil, cocoa, 
coffee, rubber, gold and the internal unrests or civil wars in the DRC between 1996-1998, 1998-2003, 2003-2008 
were fuelled by the resources  copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt, timber,  tin. As a matter of this study, the 
violence in the DRC between 1996-1998 and 1998-2003 will be in the focus of analysis, whereas the timeframe of  
the wars are defined in accordance to Nest (2006): First civil war between 1996- 1997 and the second war between 
1998- 2003.
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described and second, the  review and renegotiation process of concessions  will be examined. In 
addition, its impact for good governance will be evaluated. In the conclusion (Chapter 4) the two 
processes of post-conflict  Liberia  and DRC will  be compared, analysing which differences and 
similarities are found in relation to the resource concession management and consequences for good 
governance. Further, the last chapter will sum up the results of the analysis and provide an outlook 
for further research. 
2. The Framework Of Analysis: Defining The Key Concepts And Presenting The 
Debates In The Literature. An Overview
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the framework of analysis and hence first present the main 
definitions  and  understandings  of  key  terms  used  in  this  study.  In  addition  the  debates  in  the 
literature emerging around post- conflict peacebuilding, good governance and natural resources or 
resource management will be briefly demonstrated.
2.1 Defining Natural Resources 
The literature of natural resources as tools for peacebuilding is usually not providing a definition of 
natural resources. Therefore there is the implicate assumption that the meaning of natural resources 
is intuitive and there is no need of defining natural resources. Also the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) acknowledged the  problem of  a  concrete  definition  of  natural  resources,  especially  the 
existing “common sense” of what natural resources are  (WTO 2010: 46).  Nevertheless,  for the 
purpose of this work natural resources are all materials provided by nature and which are generally 
usable for human purposes. They are embracing renewable resources, energetic resources as well as 
non- renewable resources7 (Mildner et al. 2011: p.11)8.
2.2 Defining Conflict Resources
Because this work focuses on one possible opportunity to integrate  conflict resources in the post- 
conflict peacebuilding process in war- torn states, it is first important to understand the role these 
resources  are  playing  for  the  conflict  itself.  One  must  understand  the  dynamics  and  relations 
between  civil  war  and natural  resources,  before  building  peace  with  conflict  resources  can  be 
7 The definition was translated from German, by the author, in accordance to Mildner et al. (2011:11).
8 Also natural resources can be distinguished between lootable and non-lootable,  having impacts on the resource 
exploitation and  which  capacities  are  needed for  the  extraction  of  these  resources.  Lootability,  for  example is 
advantageous especially for rebel movements, because they can be extracted by individuals or groups with simple 
mining techniques (Rustad/ Lujala 2012: 11).
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elaborated. Therefore Global Witness define conflict resources as 
„natural  resources  whose systematic  exploitation and trade in  a  context  of  conflict  contribute  to,  
benefit  from,  or  result  in  the  commission  of  serious  violations  of  human  rights,  violations  of  
international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under international law” (Global 
Witness 2006: 10). 
But following the argument of Dam-de Jong (2015: 27) also for the purpose of this study, it is 
difficult  not  only  to  prove  that  natural  resources  contribute  to,  benefit  from  or  result  in  the 
commission of serious violations of international  law,  but  also it  might  not  be the case for all 
resources  conflicts.  Hence  this  study  defines  conflict  resources  as  “natural  resources  whose 
systematic exploitation and trade finance or fuel armed conflicts“ in accordance to Dam-de Jong 
(ibid.). On this basis, also the oversight provided by the UNEP (2009: 11) classifying „Recent civil 
wars and internal unrest fuelled by natural resources“ falls under the above presented definition.
2.3 The Concept Of Peacebuilding
The concept of peacebuilding is embedded in a broad debate in the literature. Two central points 
around the  concept  of  peacebuilding  can  be  identified.  First,  there  is  the  discussion  about  the 
definition of peacebuilding, which dimensions or policies the concept of peacebuilding includes and 
under what circumstances peacebuilding can be successful or not (e.g. Boutros- Ghali 1995; Paris 
1997, 2004; Doyle/ Sambanis 2006; Barnett et al. 2007). Second, there is the question of at what 
point post- conflict  peacebuilding begins. This is linked to discussions about what constitutes a 
post-conflict state as „post“, which is related to the distinction between peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding (e.g. Diehl/ Greig 2005; Doyle/ Sambanis 2006; Fortna/ Howard 2008; Darby/ 
MacGinty 2008). 
As a  matter  of  this  study,  it  is  first  important  to  understand how peacebuilding  is  understood, 
especially in the research related to this study9 and to define, when peacebuilding begins and hence 
when a state is in a post conflict situation.
The concept is defined as:
„Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into 
conflict  by strengthening national  capacities  at  all  levels  for  conflict  management,  and to  lay the 
foundations  for  sustainable  peace  and  development“  (UNSG’s  Policy  Committee  2007  in: 
Rustad/Lujala 2012: 5). 
This  means  in  most  cases,  also  addressing  and  if  possible  solving  the  underlying  causes  of  a 
conflict. Peacebuilding normally takes place in a post- conflict setting. The post- conflict period is 
therefore defined as starting after a peace agreement or a military victory. But because these events 
9 See e.g. Rustad/Lujala (2012: 5, 6) and Young/Goldman (2015: 3).
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are often followed by a period of great instability and interrupted by (reoccurrence) of violence, 
empirically it  is  often difficult  to  identify the actual  end of  the conflict.  Therefore  Jensen and 
Lonergan define post-conflict as: „When political, security and economic discourse and actions no 
longer revolve around armed conflict or the impact of conflict, but focus on standard development 
objectives“ (Jensen/ Lonergan 2012: 2). Consequently, the concept of peacebuilding implies four 
pillars  according  to  the  UNEP  named  “Socio-economic  development”,  “Good  governance”, 
“Reform of  justice  and  security  institutions”  and  “Culture  of  justice,  truth  and  reconciliation” 
(UNEP 2009: 31). 
2.4 The Concept Of Good Governance
This analysis focuses on the peacebuilding- pillar of good governance, and hence is not capturing 
the  debate  in  the  1990s  around  the  distinction  between  government  and  governance  (e.g. 
Rosenau/Czempiel  1992;  Rhodes  1997)  from  which  the  debate  arose.  However,  it is  widely 
acknowledged that good governance is one dimension (among others) of peacebuilding (e.g. UNEP 
2009; Bruch et al. 2015). The term good governance was first established by the World Bank in 
1989 speaking of  a  “crisis  of  governance”  in  many African  states  (World  Bank 1989:  60,  61; 
Chhotray/  Stoker  2009:  99).  From  the  beginning  it  was  embedded  in  a  discussion  around 
development  and peacebuilding  framed by the  „institutional  turn“  in  social  sciences  (Rohstein/ 
Teorell  2012:  16).  Mainly  the  World  Bank  established  good  governance as  a  condition  for 
developing countries receiving external- donor- aid (Weiss 2000: 801; Chhotray/ Stoker 2009: 99). 
This also lead to criticism, that good governance implies main aspects of democracy and hence, the 
western community is trying to democratise developing countries (Weiss 2000: 805; Paris 1997). 
The beginning of the discussion was followed by a huge debate in the literature. In contrast to the 
consensus  in  the  literature  that  good  governance  does  play  a  role  for  development  and 
peacebuilding, it is on the other hand contested how important good governance is for building 
peace (e.g. Dornboos 2001; Nanda 2006; Smith 2007; Chhotray/ Stoker 2009). As Alao states in the 
context of natural resource governance in Africa, as a matter of this analysis 
„governance is defined very broadly as the socioeconomic and political management of state affairs,  
especially as this relates to the determination of who gets what, when, and through what process. It  
also involves the interplay of relationships among the different actors concerned with the politics of 
natural resource management” (Alao 2007: 242). 
“Good“  governance  hence  implies  for  the  purposes  of  this  work,  the  principles  of  the  United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of good governance. These are seen as adequate criteria 
for  this  elaboration,  because  of  its  development  in  the  peacebuilding  context.  In  addition,  the 
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UNDP- list of principles also exists in similar form in the debate in the literature around good 
governance.  Also  as  Graham et  al.  argue,  there  “is  strong  evidence  that  these  UNDP-  based 
principles have a claim to universal recognition” (Graham et al. 2003: 3). Those five principles of  
good governance10 embrace:
(1) Legitimacy and Voice, putting together the two aspects of Participation and Consensus 
Orientation (or ”what is best for the interest of the group”)
(2) the Direction or Strategic Vision which is  explained by a  “long-term perspective on 
[...]development”, and 
(3) the Performance. Performance arises from the Responsiveness, defined by “institutions 
and processes try to serve all stakeholders”, and the Effectiveness and efficiency, stated as 
“processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of 
resources”.
(4)  Accountability,  bringing  together  Accountability  of  decision-  making  actors  and 
Transparency, meaning the (free) accessibility of information of for example processes. 
(5) the principle of Fairness, bringing together Equity and the Rule of Law (ibid.).
On the basis of the UNEP table, showing possibilities to integrate natural resource in post-conflict 
peacebuilding,  here  the  included  principles  of  legitimacy,  transparency and sharing  of  benefits 
should be analysed. Legitimacy, according to the above provided UNDP- principles is obviously 
integrated  in  „Legitimacy and Voice“,  transparency as  a  part  of  „Accountability“,  but  „Benefit 
Sharing“ is not, at least regarding to the exact term contained (Graham et al. 2003: 3; UNEP 2009: 
31).  Furthermore,  in  Section  3.1  these  principles  are  defined  and  demonstrated  how  they  are 
understood as a matter of this analysis. 
2.5 The Debates Around Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Good Governance And Natural 
Resources And Natural Resource Management
Good Governance In Context Of (Post-Conflict) Natural Resource Management
In the 1990s, the concept of  resource curse emerged, explaining the paradox of natural resource 
wealth and poor (economic) development. This was mainly referring to the high dependency on 
natural resource revenues, mismanagement and the high risks of corruption (Rustad/Lujala 2012: 9; 
Arthur 2014: 41; Karl 1997). Briefly, 
„natural resource extraction created and solidified asymmetries in wealth and increased the income 
gaps between the rich and the poor; this, in turn, contributed to the institutionalization of corruption  
10 See Appendix II.
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and enabled oppressive regimes to maintain their political power” (Arthur 2014: 41). 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to acknowledge that already at that point there was 
analogously made a connection between Natural Resource Management (NRM) and good (or bad) 
governance. Also Collier (2007) found out that abundance of natural resources and the absence of 
good  governance  leads  to  the  creation  of  greed  (Collier  2007;  Owusu  et  al.  2014:  221)  and 
mismanagement of natural resources (Mehlum et al. 2006). In addition Alao describes, that most of 
the conflicts over natural resources in Africa have underlying cause in the lack of ability of state 
institutions  to  manage  natural  resources,  especially  related  to  the  differing  opportunities,  fiscal 
management, the distribution of revenues and the protection of minority and property rights (Alao 
2007: 242, 243).
Because the  resource curse is seen as a governance related problem, good governance is often 
presented  as  a  „panacea  for  resource  mismanagement  in  Africa“  in  order  to  reach  an  overall 
development  (Arthur  2014: 50).  As a consequence the emergence of conflicts  linked to natural 
resources are recently more understood as related to the management or mismanagement of natural 
resources or more broadly of natural resource governance (Frerks et al. 2014: 14; Mehlum et al.  
2006). 
Post- Conflict Peacebuilding And Natural Resources
Although there have been discussions about good governance and NRM, it  seems that when it 
comes to the nexus of NRM, peacebuilding and good governance focusing on post- conflict states 
the scientific literature is still ongoing. The scientific elaborations of this subject mainly based on 
case studies, country specific post- conflict resource management and which lessons can be drawn 
out  of these settings (Bruch et  al.  2009:  62,  Rustad/Lujala  2012,  Young/Goldman 2015).  First, 
resource management for the purpose of peacebuilding has to be distinguished from measures in 
peacetimes. In post- conflict regions, the institutional capacity is weak, social distrust is present, a 
government authority is often non- existent and the prior aim for policy makers in post- conflict  
environments is to maintain peace (Bruch et al. 2009). 
Even  though,  there  is  no  “general”  theory  of  Post-  Conflict  Natural  Resource  Management 
(PCNRM) existing, several debates are emerging around certain key concepts (Frerks et al. 2014: 
14). 
One broader approach is the concept of livelihood. Here, the core idea of the argument is, that not 
only poverty or environmental factors themselves are driver for conflict but the loss of livelihoods 
due to environmental degradation (Frerks et al. 2014: 20; Young/Goldman 2015).
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Another  strand  of  scholars  have  a  different  understanding  of  the  role  of  high-  value  natural 
resources  for  post-conflict  peacebuilding.  Their  argument  focuses  on  a  more  instrumentalist 
approach,  claiming  that  the  environment  could  be  a  unique  peacebuilding  tool  with  certain 
characteristics: “environmental  challenges  ignore  political  boundaries,  require  a  long-term 
perspective, encourage local and non- governmental participation, and extend community building 
beyond polarizing economic linkages “ (Conca et al. 2005: 149)11.
Also  from  the  political  economic  perspective,  several  scholars  are  analysing  natural  resource 
management and opportunities for development and economic growth (e.g. Bannon/Collier 2003; 
Ballentine/ Nietzschke 2005; Humphreys et al. 2007; Ford 2015). 
Either way, in the literature focusing more on (practical) policy suggestions and emerging problems, 
all of these perspectives are integrated in policy recommendations. There is a consensus about the 
need for  developing  (case specific) strategies and NRM measures and their importance for the 
transition to peace (Bruch et  al.  2009;  Frerks et  al.  2014; UNEP 2009). Because especially for 
resource-rich countries,  natural  resources may provide livelihoods for the (local) population and 
could,  when  managed  well,  be  a  major  source  of  (national)  income.  “Failure  to  respond  to 
environmental  needs  of  war-torn  societies  may  greatly  complicate  the  difficult  task  of 
peacebuilding” (Conca/ Wallace 2009: 486). 
This goes along with the demands of important political  actors like the UNEP for  “integrating 
environment  and  natural  resources  into  peacebuilding  is  no  longer  an  option-  it  is  a  security 
imperative” (UNEP 2009: 5). But only one quarter of peace negotiation in affected countries have 
addressed natural resource mechanisms (ibid.). 
Due to the fact, that peacebuilding is a broad concept, as presented above, there are several entry 
points for studies or research of PCNRM. For example, some scholars are focusing on the natural 
resources in peacemaking as the basis for peacebuilding (e.g. Haysom/ Kane 2009; Bruch et al.  
2009) or on shared management of natural resources and their revenues as a confidence- building 
measure between parties, important for realizing other means, like provide basic services, rebuild 
the economy and avoid a return into conflict (UNEP 2009; Conca/Wallace 2009; Young/Goldman 
2015). Also some look at concrete concepts like Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and 
natural resources (e.g. UNEP/ UNDP 2013), policies to limit illegal extraction of natural resources, 
the  degradation  of  the  environment,  revenue  sharing,  commodity  tracking,  revenue  or  wealth 
distribution  and  gender  issues  (e.g.  UNEP 2009;  Jensen/Lonergan  2012;  Rustad/Lujala  2012; 
Hayes/ Perks 2012; Young/ Goldman 2015). Also several initiatives and international organisations 
11 Embedded in this approach, there is for example rich (on case studies) based literature, how shared (transboundary) 
water resources could be catalysts for more cooperation between conflict parties and therefore a long- lasting peace  
prospect (ibid.). But this will not be included in this study, due to the focus on intrastate wars.
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have suggested „good“ policies for the management of natural resources and their revenue, like the 
Mining Sector Reforms of the World Bank (2003) and the Resource Charter of the Natural Resource 
Governance  Institute  (NRGI)  (NRGI 2014).  All  in  all,  NRM can show war-  torn  societies  the 
benefits of peace and increase the confidence in government (Conca/Wallace 2009: 499; Beevers 
2015: 29). But the great risk is, that the implementation in practice is not effective or the benefits 
are  divided  along  conflict  lines  (Haysom/  Kane  2009;  Green  2015).  Hence  „proper  resource 
governance  could  not  only help  resolve  resource  conflicts,  but  also  prevent  them and  lead  to 
peaceful mutual relations“ (Frerks et al. 2014: 14). 
The Management Of Resource Concessions And Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
The management of resource concessions, as a part of PCNRM is highly relevant to a post- conflict 
state blessed with natural resources. Good management of conflict resources through the concession 
allocation process could guarantee a state the reliable and high income it needs for development and 
reconstruction and establish employment. It might also be a first step in showing the population a 
more transparent, legitimate system of governing in interest of the people in order to regain trust  
and hence it can be a major step for the transition to peace (Le Billon 2012: 69).  Concerning the 
management of natural resource concessions in a post conflict environment a primary goal should 
be the review, renegotiation or cancellation of resource contracts awarded to extractive industry 
during the civil war and transitional periods. This is of high priority because these licences were in 
many cases signed by corrupt or illegitimate leaders and are therefore often not valid. Also these 
concessions might not be made in the best interest of the population or the state and therefore there 
is the prospect of maximising the states revenues through a reappraisal process (Chêne 2007; Le 
Billon 2012: 70; Rustad et al. 2013).
Focusing in this study concretely on the review and renegotiation process of mining concessions in 
post- conflict states, like Liberia and the DRC the literature provided is still in its beginnings and 
mainly  coming  from  the  political  economic  perspective  or  published  by  research  institutions, 
Initiatives or NGOs, like NRGI, Global Witness and the Transparency and Accountability Initiative 
(TAI). 
Although it is mentioned in policy recommendations from the UNEP (2009), in a policy Brief of the 
Environmental  Law Institute  (ELI)  and the  UNEP (UNEP/  ELI  2013)  there  are  some scholars 
analysing this issue based on case studies trying to draw lessons and/or embed it into a broader, 
more general  approach (e.g.  Le Billon  2008;  Rosenblum /Maples  2009;  Tienhaara/  Ford 2010; 
Rustad et al. 2012: 578, 579; Lukanda 2014). Le Billion for example, includes the assumption that 
if  managed  well,  renegotiation  of  resource  contracts  can  maximise  public  revenues,  foster 
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transparency  and  accountability  and  mitigate  the  social  and  environmental  impact  of  resource 
exploitation (Le Billon 2008: 5,6 ; 2012: 69). He also pinpoints risks of renegotiations for post- 
conflict states, like for example endure inexperienced or unregulated companies in order to jump- 
start the economy, which might create problems in the long- term (Le Billon 2012: 71). Chêne for 
example,  spotlights risks in the renegotiation of mining contracts,  especially corruption (Chêne 
2007). Some scholars generally focus on the role of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(and good governance) (Rich/Warner 2012; Hilson/Maconachie 2008) or for example the European 
Union  Initiatives  (Brack  2012)  as  peacebuilding  efforts.  Especially  concerning  the  DRC  the 
provided research of analysis of the reappraisal process is limited and is often including demands, 
for example for greater transparency (Carter Center 2007, 2009; Kabemba 2008; Le Billon 2012; 
Lukanda 2014). 
This study of analysing the good governance dimension of peacebuilding through the reappraisal 
process of resource concessions in post- conflict societies, is trying to provide an effort for further 
research  for  the  ongoing  debate  in  the  literature.  Even  though  the  „single“  debates  of  good 
governance,  peacebuilding natural resources and civil  war are often discussed, to what extent a 
government could foster peacebuilding after a civil war associated with conflict resources through 
the management of natural resource concessions has not been in the focus of research yet. Hence, 
which derives the relevance of this study. 
3. Evaluation Of The Governmental Management Of Resource Concessions Fostering 
Good Governance In Post-Conflict Liberia And The Democratic Republic Of The 
Congo
The aim of this chapter is an evaluation of the management of resource concessions fostering good 
governance of post- conflict Liberia and the DRC. Therefore, the first step will be to embed the 
focused aspects of this work - legitimacy, transparency and sharing of benefits- into the debate of 
good governance and to define and adopt these principles for the purpose of this analysis. Following 
that, first the Liberian civil war (1989-2003) with a focus on the role of natural resources will be 
briefly demonstrated. Then a detailed presentation of the process of the review and renegotiation of 
resource concessions taking place in Liberia will be shown and to what extent this process was 
fostering good governance. The next section concentrates on the second case study, the DRC. Also, 
the role of natural resources in war (1996-2003) should be determined in order to understand the 
problematic  concerning  natural  resources.  However,  because  of  the  limited  framework  of  this 
elaboration, it stands to reason that a detailed understanding of the underlying and historical causes 
of both wars cannot be delivered. In addition, having the same structure as the Liberian case, the  
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reappraisal process of resource contracts will be worked out and assessed.
3.1 The Principles Of Good Governance: Legitimacy, Transparency And The Sharing Of 
Benefits
As explained above, the basis of the UNEP chart the three principles of legitimacy, transparency 
and sharing of benefits should be examined. 
The Principle Of Legitimacy
The principle of legitimacy, embedded in “Legitimacy and Voice”, are composed of “Participation 
and “Consensus Orientation” according to the UNDP guideline. Participation constitutes „all men 
and  women  should  have  a  voice  in  decision-making,  either  directly  or  through  legitimate 
intermediate institutions that represent their intention. Such broad participation is built on freedom 
of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively” (Graham et al. 2003: 
3). In addition, consensus orientation is defined as „good governance  [which] mediates differing 
interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, 
on policies and procedures” (ibid.). 
The  decision-making  processes in  this  analysis  are the  governmental  review and renegotiation 
processes in the two post-conflict cases of Liberia and the DRC. For the purpose of this work, 
participation  in  the  context  of  the  review  and  renegotiation  process  through  „intermediate 
institutions that represent their intention“ should be understood here as the members of the Review 
Group or Commission. Furthermore the possibilities for NGOs or other civil society organizations 
to influence the decision-making process, for example in the role of observers, or of the population 
itself to exercise influence on the decision-making process, is here understood as directly having a 
voice in the process. This goes along with the related assumption from Lockwood et al. (2010: 13) 
that ensuring “genuine dialogue between NRM organizations and their stakeholder constituencies, 
including allowing stakeholders to exert substantive influence on decision-making that affects their 
welfare, may also foster legitimacy”. 
Hence it should be analysed which formal existing channels of voice these actors had in the review 
and renegotiation process in the two cases. For analytical reasons, the second part of the definition 
is  not  captured  in  this  analysis,  whereas  capacities,  for  example  to  have  access  to  relevant 
information, are mentioned in the section of transparency. 
Related to the aspect of “Participation”, “Legitimacy and Voice” is consensus orientation. The main 
issue here entails the goal to reach a decision of “what is in the best interest of the group”, which is 
understood  here,  as  an  outcome  of  the  review and  renegotiation  process  which  is  at  least  an 
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improvement compared to the original agreement and hence produce a result in the interest of the 
country.  Also here the policies and procedures  in this  work embrace the review and (possible) 
renegotiation process. The consensus orientation can be exercised in the procedure itself, through 
consensus strategies for example in the Commission. Consequently, as a matter of this work, the 
focus should lay on the outcome, or the result of the renegotiation process and the strategy used in 
the review and renegotiation process. 
The Principle Of Transparency 
Also, according to these UNDP good governance principles, “Transparency” is one dimension of 
“Accountability” and is therefore embedded in the concept of good governance. 
The definition of transparency12, as provided in the good governance guideline of the UNDP is here 
seen  as  not  easy  to  operationalise  and  adopt,  especially  in  the  context  of  natural  resource 
management. Hence the following definition of transparency is used for the purpose of this work, 
provided by TAI,  developed in the  context  of  natural  resource governance: „Transparency is  a 
characteristic of governments, companies, organisations and individuals that are open in the clear 
disclosure  of  information,  rules,  plans,  processes  and  actions“  (Darby 2010:  9).  In  this  work, 
because of focusing on the governmental review and renegotiation process, it is the transparency of 
the governmental process which will be in the centre of analysis. In addition, as „ a principle it is 
that public officials and civil servants have to act visibly, predictably and understandably“ (ibid.). 
But the TAI, also add, that simply making information accessible is not sufficient, consequently the 
information should also embrace two qualifying criteria (Darby 2010: 9): 
1)  Relevant  and  accessible:  The  information  should  be  disclosed  plainly  and  in  
comprehensible language, in formats accessible for diverse stakeholders, whilst maintaining 
the details and disaggregation needed for analysis, evaluation and participation . 
2) Timely and accurate: „Information should be made available in sufficient time to permit 
analysis, evaluation and engagement by relevant stakeholders“ (ibid.: 9). This implies, that 
the  information  should  be  available  for  planning,  during  the  process  and  after  the  
implementation of policies. The information should be up-to date, accurate and complete.
Following from these definitions, subject to the analysis here and the relevant information will be 
an official announcement of the process, the terms of reference for the review, the review report, the 
renegotiation priorities or terms of reference and finally the outcome of the renegotiation process 
12 The  UNDP defines  “Transparency”  as  the  following:  “transparency  is  built  on  the  free  flow  of  information. 
Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information 
is provided to understand and monitor them” (Graham et al.2003: 3).
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through the disclosure of contracts (the original and the amended)13. For the aim of this work, this 
information is seen as important for transparency of the review and renegotiation process, because 
due  to  the  announcement  the  process  visibly  began.  Also,  in  regard  to  the  predictability  and 
understandability of the process, meaning that the rules and plans are clear, the terms of reference 
for the review process or respectively the renegotiation priorities or terms of reference have to be 
known, at least for the members of the commission. To understand and predict the renegotiation 
process, it is, as understood here, relevant for the process to make the review report available to  
diverse stakeholders, which means at least the members and participants of the Committee, but at 
best also a public disclosure. 
These documents should be disclosed plainly and in comprehensible language (according to criteria 
one) and here especially focusing on the aspects of timely and complete (according to criteria two). 
Based  on  the  fact,  that  in  both  cases  the  government  is  executing  the  process  and  has  been 
democratically elected, here is the assumption that the information provided is accurate.
The Principle Of Benefit Sharing
The principle of benefit sharing as an aspect of good governance, is not included in the UNDP 
principles. Due to that fact, the term for the aim of this study understood as the following, stated by 
REDD+14, a programme for forest resource management. This definition is chosen, because it lays 
in the field of natural resource management,  and even though it  is  not particularly mining, the 
definition also comes from the extractive industry sector and hence it is assumed that it can be more 
easily adopted for the purpose of this study. 
“Benefit sharing or sharing of benefits refers to an  intentional  transfer of financial payments and 
payments in the form of goods and services to intended beneficiaries” (Behr  et al.  2012: 6, 7). 
Benefit sharing is not resulting from a payment for a good or service regulated through the market 
price nor the recruitment of employees though a competition of the market (ibid.). Hence, benefit 
sharing could include any of the following: 
• “Any general payments, services, or other things of value15 provided unilaterally because the law 
requires it16 […] 
13 Concerning negotiated resource contracts „good practice for transparency, however, would require the publication of 
all signed contracts“ or at least the ex post publication of these contracts (Rosenblum/Maples 2009: 55). 
14 REDD+ is a United Nations (UN) Collaborative Programme with the aim of Reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+).
15 See Behr et al. (2012: 7): “Other things of value might include goods; training; preferential hiring patterns such as 
requirement to hire local  labor;  physical  infrastructure such as water supplies,  roads,  buildings,  communication 
lines,  or  improvements  that  open  land  to  new  uses;  social  services  including  education,  health  services,  or 
community organization; sharing, conveyance, or recognition of authority or legal rights; credit; access to markets;  
or anything else the local partner finds valuable “.
16  “[…] such as a share of taxes, royalties, or fees received by the government or a share of revenues generated by the  
outside partner” (Behr et al. 2012: 6, 7).
15
• or  on what  might  appear  to  be better-than-market  terms,  but  generating value to  the  outside 
partner in the form of goodwill17 […] [or] to achieve a non- commercial objective of the outside 
partner18 […]
• Profit sharing“ (ibid.). 
Therefore, outgoing from this definition, this study will look at what benefit sharing aspects the 
governmental renegotiation process achieved. Because the definition above, provides a quite broad 
catalogue of what factors are included in benefit sharing, for the purpose of this study it should be 
looked at the existing negotiated improvement towards benefit sharing included in the amended 
contracts. Therefore, in the following, some gains for benefit sharing should be demonstrated for 
analytical reasons exemplary, looking at preferential hiring patterns to hire local labour and social 
services. 
3.2 Analysing The Case Of Post-Conflict Liberia
Liberia, located on the African west coast is wealthy of natural resources: rubber, tropical timber, 
iron  ore,  gold  and  diamonds.  Historically,  the  state  has  not  established  regulation  policies  for 
(foreign) private investment as long as revenues from the exploitation of natural resources were 
ensured. Therefore little attention was given to standards, like human rights, labour circumstances 
or environmental protection. Also the state, or officials through the power of the state, enriched 
themselves through resource exploitation (Tienhaara/ Ford 2010: 363).
Also, besides the history of the state's resource exploitation of foreign investors, natural resources 
or generally the environment are highly relevant for the Liberian people for daily life. Most of the 
Liberians are living in rural areas and are therefore dependent on the environment, like agriculture 
and forest products for their livelihoods (Altman et al. 2012: 339).
Consequently,  also  the  industry  and  economy  is  highly  dependent  on  (the  export)  of  natural 
resources. Because of Liberia's large assets of iron ore, diamonds and gold, the main commercial 
products are palm oil, cocoa, coffee and rubber19. Especially before the civil war in Liberia, the 
country was heavily reliable on the mining of iron ore and one of the major exporters of such 
(International  Business  Publications,  USA 2013:  98).  After  the end of  the  civil  war,  the  major 
exports are especially rubber and timber (ibid.)
17 “[…] (of the local partner, of government, of potential customers, and so forth), such as preferential hiring of local 
persons or paying designated individuals/households or communities a share of profits obtained from the project “  
(Behr et al. 2012: 6, 7).
18 “[…] such as empowerment of minorities, reduction of poverty, or conservation of biodiversity.” (Behr et al. 2012: 
6, 7).
19 See  Ministry  of  Commerce  and  Industry,  Liberia  (n.d.):  Major  Exports  Trading  Partners;  URL:  
http://www.moci.gov.lr/2content.php?sub=74&related=18&third=74&pg=sp , 07.01.2015.
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3.2.1 The Liberian Context: Civil War, Conflict Resources And The Way To A Post- Conflict 
State
The Liberian civil war (between 1989- 2003) broke out 1989 when Charles Taylor, first a warlord 
later a president, tried to overthrow the government of Sergeant Samuel Doe. At that time, social, 
political  and  ethnic  tensions  erupted.  Charles  Taylor  started  rebellion  to  overthrow  Doe's 
government with his fraction,  the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). By June 1990 the 
NPFL entered Monrovia, Doe flew and Taylor declared himself the new President. 
Later the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) was founded as a break- away 
fraction of Taylor's rebel group and murdered the overthrown President Doe. After Taylor got into 
power,  also  the  supporters  of  President  Doe  created  an  own  fraction,  the  United  Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). These three parties,  fought a long, bloody and 
destructive war in Liberia (Gariba 2011: 112). After the intervention and mediation of the Economic 
Community of Western Africa States (ECOWAS) the conflict parties signed the Abuja Accords in 
1995 and settled new elections. The elections held in 1997 were won by Charles Taylor and he 
became President. But several actors did not want to acknowledge Taylor's success in the elections 
and violence broke out again. Exiled Liberians in Guinea founded a new movement, the Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), attacking the government of Charles Taylor. On 
the other hand, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) operating from and backed by 
the Ivory Coast was also fighting against the President's regime (Gariba 2011: 112; Ford 2015: 138, 
139).
Even  though,  the  underlying  roots  of  the  Liberian  war  are  still  discussed,  the  (international) 
attention  to  the  civil  war  has  mainly  focused  on  the  economic  aspect  of  Charles  Taylor's 
government. Beevers argues that Taylor misused his power and control to exploit and trade with 
conflict resources, like diamonds, iron ore, rubber and timber to reproduce his power and enrich 
himself (Smillie et al. 2000: 48; UNSC 2001b; Beevers 2012: 373; Altmann et al. 2012: 340)20. 
Whereas  Ellis  (1999) found out  that  in  the early stages  of the war,  the rebel  movements were 
grounded and recruited for a political  aim and change, Reno (1998) argues from the economic 
perspective.  He  claimed  that  Taylor  was  more  aiming  to  reach  control  over  natural  resource 
markets, than for a political goal. But nevertheless, during civil war both sides, the government and 
the diverse rebel movements strived to gain control over Liberia's natural resource wealth in order 
to fund the war and finance military actions (UNSC 2001b; Altman et al. 2012: 340; Beevers 2012: 
20 But Charles Taylor efforts to gain access to natural resources went even beyond Liberia's borders. He was involved 
in the civil war of the neighbouring country Sierra Leone, supporting his allies, the Revolutionary United Front  
(RUF), as some scholars are arguing, in order to gain access to Sierra Leone's diamond fields and to fund violence  
(Ross 2004: 57; UNEP 2009:10; Beevers 2012: 373).
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373).  The international community became more and more aware of the connection between the 
Liberian civil  war and natural  resources.  Hence,  the UN attempted to  address the dynamics of 
conflict, but failed to stop or mitigate the trajectory of the Liberian war. At least thirteen peace 
agreements trying to end the war in Liberia failed, because warring parties feared they would loose 
access to Liberia's resource wealth and hence lengthen the violence (Ross 2004: 53).
As a result,  the UN Security Council (UNSC) first banned the import of diamonds from Sierra 
Leone (UNSC 2000a:  2)  and later  the import  of  timber  products  originated  in  Liberia  (UNSC 
2003a: 4). But violence continued until June 2003, when the (international) pressure21 forced Taylor 
to  step  down  and  he  flew  to  Exile  in  Nigeria  (UNEP 2009:  10).  The  Comprehensive  Peace  
Agreement (CPA) between the warring fractions LURD, MODEL and Taylor's government was 
signed in August 2003 (Ford 2015: 140). The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) 
was established and elections prepared. In addition, the UN established a United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL's mandate embraced among other aspects, humanitarian assistance, a 
security sector reform and the special pillar „to assist the transitional government in restoring proper 
administration of natural resources“ (UNSC 2003b: 4; Altman et al. 2012: 342; Ford 2015: 141). 
As  demonstrated  above,  in  the  Liberian  civil  war  there  was  a  strong  relation  between  the 
(exploitation of) natural resources and the war was thus fuelled by conflict resources (UNEP 2009: 
11; Altman et al. 2012: 340). More than 250.000 people died during civil war, natural resources got 
highly exploited and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was reduced by 50 percent (Altman et al. 
2012: 340, 341). Also, the point of the installation of the NTGL can be seen as the beginning of the 
post-conflict period in Liberia. Latest, for the aim of this analysis, at the end of the NTGL and the 
elections held in 2005 with the new female President Ellen Sirleaf the stage of peacebuilding was 
reached, because since then the political discourse was focusing on development objectives22
3.2.2 The Post- Conflict Governmental Review, Renegotiation And Cancellation Process Of 
Natural Resource Concessions
In  the  following  section,  the  process  of  the  review,  renegotiation  and cancellation  of  resource 
concessions in post- conflict Liberia should be demonstrated. In particular, in regard to what extent 
this  process  was  fostering  legitimacy,  transparency  and  benefit  sharing.  In  the  centre  of  the 
elaboration will be the review process and the renegotiation with the Mittal Steel Holdings N.V. 
(ArcelorMittal) and the Firestone Natural Rubber Company LLC. (Firestone). Those have been the 
21 It is uncertain, if the UN sanctions directly had an impact in ending the war, but by putting the focus on Charles  
Taylor  and  conflict  resources,  it  helped  to  frame the  understanding  of  the  Liberian  civil  war,  of  the  UN and 
peacebuilders (Beevers 2012: 373,374). 
22 See for example, President Ellen- Johnson Silreaf's inaugural speech (Sirleaf 2006).
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two biggest resource concessions awarded in Liberia and issue of the governmental reappraisal 
process. Also rubber and iron ore have been described as conflict resources fuelling the civil war in 
Liberia (UNEP 2009: 11).
In the case of Liberia, this process was supported by the Governance and Economic Management 
Assistance Program for Liberia (GEMAP), signed by the Transitional Government in 2005, with all 
the international partners and donors. One aspect of this agreement was to start a review process of 
all the resource concessions (Ellis 2008: 121). Under GEMAP, it was also the issue to review the 
ArcelorMittal and the Firestone contract, both signed by the NTGL in 2005, which was known as 
“exceedingly corrupt” (Rosenblum/Maples 2009: 52). That is why, on “January 16, 2006, shortly 
after  coming  into  office  […] President  Ellen  Johnson-Sirleaf  instituted  a  policy  to  review  all 
contracts  and  concessions  entered  into  by  the  transitional  government  that  preceded  her” 
(Rosenblum/ Maples 2009: 52)23.  The GEMAP mandated the  Liberia’s Public  Procurement and 
Concessions Commission (PPCC) with the task to review those agreements.
But due to the slow starting process of GEMAP by mid- 2006, the government began a separate,  
independent fast track review of those two concession agreements with ArcelorMittal and Firestone. 
The government was reacting to the high pressure and expectations from the population, as well as 
from the international community.
Whereas  the  GEMAP mandated  review  of  the  NTGL contracts  was  the  consequence  of  the 
government's and international concerns about the mismanagement of natural resources and public 
finances during the transitional period, the fast- track review of Sirleaf was embedded into a broader 
agenda.  The  from her  initiated  reappraisal  process  aimed  not  only  to  address  these  doubts  of 
mismanagement,  but  also to  focus  on  social  and economic  needs  of  Liberia's  war-torn  society 
(Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 27; Rosenblum /Maples 2009: 52). 
Sirleaf  established  for  each  contract  review  and  renegotiation  an  Inter-Ministerial  Concession 
Committee (IMCC)24 and a negotiation team, which were directly connected to the President and 
her Cabinet. Members of the IMCCs were government officials and technical advisor, but did not 
include representatives from international parties or the civil society. So parallel to the GEMAP 
23 See also the Speech of President Sirleaf on the Occasion of the Formal Launching of the Extractive Transparency 
Initiative In Liberia Tuesday, 10th July 2007 (Sirleaf 2007: 3).
24 For the review process concerning the ArcelorMittal Agreement, the President appointed the following members for 
the IMCC: Minister of Lands Mines and Energy as chair of the ArcelorMittal IMCC. Also representatives from the 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of State, Financial, Legal and Economic Affairs, Ministry of  
Planning & Economic Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee, and the 
National Investment Commission.
For the review process  concerning the Firestone Concession Agreement,  the President  appointed the following 
members for the IMCC: Minister of Agriculture as chair of the Firestone IMCC and included representatives from 
the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of State, National Investment Commission  
and the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 31, 32, 42).
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mandated Contracts and Concessions Review Committee (CCRC), the governmental Committee 
started the review and renegotiation process with Firestone and ArcelorMittal, which will be in the 
following in the centre of analysis.
The ArcelorMittal Review And Renegotiation Process
The original concession agreement, the Mineral Development Agreement (MDA) was signed by the 
NTGL, not even a year before the review, in August 2005. The MDA was an „exclusive right to 
explore, develop and produce and market iron ore and associated minerals in the concession area“ 
(Kaul/  Heuty  2009:  4).  Before  this  agreement,  the  resource  concession  in  this  area  has  been 
awarded to an American- Swedish minerals company since 1960. Therefore, the MDA represented 
the first significant new investment in Liberia since 20 years. The company promised a 900 million 
dollar  investment  for  Liberia  and hence  it  “was  the  most  important  contract  among  a  number 
reviewed“ (Ellis 2008: 123). 
In June 2006, the IMCC started preparing the reappraisal. As a first step, the Committee reviewed 
the original contract and delivered recommendations to the President and her Cabinet for further 
renegotiations.  The  IMCC had  technical  assistance  from governmental  and  non-  governmental 
advisor25, even though there was no formal mechanism like the CCRC. In the beginning of August, 
the IMCC delivered its report to the President. At the end of the month, also the CCRC submitted  
its  report,  supporting  the  IMCC's  concluding  recommendation  to  renegotiate  the  MDA with 
ArcelorMittal.  One  argument  for  example  brought  up,  was  that  the  MDA contract  was  not 
compatible with the Liberian law and in particular not in the best interest of Liberia. However, as a  
result of the review process, the IMCC and the Government decided to renegotiate instead of cancel 
the contract. The President appointed a governmental negotiation team and defined negotiations 
priorities,  which  only  have  been  accessible  to  the  members  of  the  negotiation  team and  their 
advisor26.  In  addition to  the  ISLP report,  that  outlined the  Government’s  options  if  it  chose to 
renegotiate the ArcelorMittal MDA, the IMCC also had access to an earlier report on the MDA, 
prepared by the Columbia Law School (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 32).
The renegotiation process started in September 2006 in New York. The Liberian negotiation team 
agreed on a very cautious strategy, being aware of the experience of the business negotiators. For 
25 The work of the IMCC for the ArcelorMittal review and renegotiation was for example assisted by reports prepared 
by Professor Bob Hillman, Professor Lou Wells and Joe Bell of the International Senior Lawyers Project  (ISLP), 
after a request of President Sirleaf (ibid.:32). 
26 These four priorities were composed of: “1. the rail and port are part of Liberia’s national strategic interest and 
Government must retain ownership of these assets;  2.  to the extent possible,  the new contract  must reflect  the 
principle of general  applicability of Liberian law, especially in fiscal  and environmental  matters; 3.  the revised 
contract should not encroach on the sovereignty of Liberia (e.g., with respect to stabilization, etc.); and 4. where  
possible, the team should seek to maximize near term revenue to the Government “ (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 32, 33).
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example, the several members of the Liberian negotiation team, except the Chairman only spoke in 
intern discussions and not in the negotiation round. After several negotiation rounds, both parties 
reached an amended agreement in December 2006. Both sides signed a non binding confidential 
protocol, including all issues and concerns recommended by the IMCC. But just before the last 
negotiation round should be completed, the ArcelorMittal company raised doubts about the tax and 
provisions on contractors in the outline. After a direct meeting with President Sirleaf, her advisor 
and the Chairman of the company, the issue was discussed and they ended the dispute. On 28 th of 
December in 2006, both parties signed the renegotiated concession contract (ibid.: 36).
The Firestone Review And Renegotiation Process
The review process, concerning the Concession Agreement with Firestone signed in April 2005 by 
the NTGL was similar to the ArcelorMittal review. But because Firestone is a company, rooted in 
Liberia's economy for more than 80 years, the review process implied several challenges and risks. 
Firestone was not a new investor like ArcelorMittal, trying to keep the new concession in order to 
profit from the increasing commodity prices. Also, beside the state itself, the company is the largest 
employer providing 4000 jobs to the Liberian population. Even though, the (international) support 
for the renegotiations by Sirleaf government was high, Firestone did not have strong incentive to 
agree on renegotiating the existing contract. Also in this case, the IMCC was assisted by external  
and internal advisor27 and submitted a report to the President with the recommendation to enter 
renegotiation with Firestone. Again it was underlined, by the same recommendation of the parallel 
ongoing CCRC review process (ibid.: 43). 
In 2007, after the ArcelorMittal amended contract was ratified, the President appointed as well a 
governmental  negotiation  team  with  technical  advisor,  a  subset  of  the  Firestone  IMCC  and 
presented the members and advisor the priorities for the negotiation process28. The involved parties 
were consent about the need to negotiate confidently and behind close doors, in order to achieve the 
aimed changes. Firestone participated at the negotiation rounds in Washington D.C., but announced 
concerns about the need for renegotiation of the valid Concession Agreement of 2005. However, the 
Government  challenged this  complain,  stating that  under  the terms of the Agreement,  Liberia's 
27 The Firestone IMCC was supported by the following technical advisor: “Mr. Michael Jordan, a rubber industry 
financial  expert  familiar  with  Liberia’s  rubber  industry,  Mr.  Jim  Belcher,  a  rubber  industry  consultant  to  the  
Government and later by Mr. Joe Bell of the ISLP “ (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 42). 
28 These four principle to guide the negotiations were: „1. to the extent possible, the new contract must reflect the  
principle of general applicability of Liberian law, especially in fiscal and environmental matters; 2. transfer pricing  
must be based on arms-length transactions linked to international market mechanisms; 3. the revised contract must  
have a commitment from Firestone for value-added manufacturing (e.g. a rubberwood factory); and 4. the automatic 
50-year  Extended Term must be eliminated and the term of the Agreement  limited to 36 years:  the period for  
Rehabilitation and Regular Terms” (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 43, 44).
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Government has the right to renegotiate. Following the same strategy and trajectory like in the other 
negotiations, an agreement between the parties was achieved in November 2007, addressing all the 
issues raised in the review reports of the IMCC and the CCRC.
The Ratification Process
After each process, as demonstrated above, the amended concession agreements have been timely 
submitted to the Legislature (the ArcelorMittal agreement, after signing by the end of December 
2006, the Firestone agreement by the end of February 2008) (ibid.: 36, 42). The contracts have been 
presented to the National Legislature by the negotiation team in a public hearing, also heard by 
several stakeholders, company representatives and civil society actors (ibid.: 27). In addition, it was 
broadcast live on radio. Furthermore, there was a wide national and international media coverage. 
In each process, after public and confidential discussion rounds of the Legislature, both agreements 
got ratified in April 2007 (ArcelorMittal) and March 2008 (Firestone) and finally signed by the 
President (Ellis 2008; Kaul/ Heuty 2009). After the ratification, the agreements were printed on 
handbills and hence made a public document. Also Papers named „Summary of the Main Changes 
brought  about  by  the  Government  of  Liberia's  Review  of  the  Mittal  Mineral  Development 
Agreement“ and „Summary of the Main Changes Brought about by the Government of Liberia's 
Review of the 2005 Concession Agreement with Firestone Liberia, Inc.” have been published by the 
Government and are accessible29. The agreements in full length are public, but not easy to access yet 
(Rosenblum/Maples  2009:  52).  Both  reviews  and  renegotiations  of  these  resource  concessions 
between  2006  and  2008  had  enormous  improvements  compared  to  the  original  contractual 
frameworks.  The  renegotiated  ArcelorMittal  agreement  has  around  30  percent  improvements, 
whereas the Firestone renegotiation process even resulted in nearly 40 percent amendments (Kaul/ 
Heuty 2009).
3.2.3 Evaluation Of The Impact Of Resource Concessions For Good Governance
This section will analyse to what extent the reappraisal process of the ArcelorMittal and Firestone 
concession, exercised by the post-conflict Liberian government fostered good governance, focusing 
on the three aspects of legitimacy, transparency and sharing of benefits. 
29 These Summaries are available at the Government of Liberia website. See Executive Mansion Liberia (2006) for the 




In the case of Liberia, the IMCC was created by the democratically elected President and composed 
of (elected) members of the Parliament and Government, and thus might be described as „legitimate 
representatives“30. Therefore through indirect participation, the analysis here gives a hint that the 
population had a voice in the decision- making process. This is also supported by the above showed 
argument, that the members were personally accountable and could make decisions in the process. 
Only in matters of dispute, the President had the last decision making option (Kaul/Heuty 2009: 
10). But there has been no formal mechanism to include civil society actors nor existed possibilities 
for participation of the affected population. Even though, according to Kaul and Heuty (2009) there 
have been some informal advice and consultations with civil society organisations, which could not 
be examined in the framework of this analysis, the direct participation and part of legitimacy might 
not have been fostered. 
In addition, the IMCC was an ad hoc Commission without any formal obligations, also for the 
selection of the members of the Commission. Hence these members were hand picked and selected 
from the President from several related ministries, which in the case of Liberia might have fostered 
participation. But only because Sirleaf chose commission members with different backgrounds and 
expertise, representing the basis of „differing interest“, like defined for legitimacy (ibid.: 52). 
Furthermore, these diverse actors agreed during the review, and especially during the renegotiation 
process on a consensus strategy.  Hence,  not  only the strategy used in  the process  of decision-
making itself shows some evidence for consensus orientation, but also the outcome of the process 
might present consensus orientation. Because as a result of the process, the short- term revenue was 
maximized and also one company, ArcelorMital promised to raise its investment from $1.0 billion 
to $1.5 billion (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 2). Further, between 30 and 40 improvements compared to the 
original contracts could be achieved through the process, which was generally seen as a success (Le 
Billon 2012: 76, Cotula 2010: 5; Rosenblum/ Maples 2009: 52) with „significant gains for Liberia“ 
(Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 1). According to these aspects, there might be some evidence, that especially 
due to the improvement of the amended contracts, consensus orientation or „for what is best in the 
group“ could have been fostered through the process. 
Evaluation Of Transparency 
In the case of Liberia's fast track review and renegotiation process, concentrating on the two biggest 
mining concessions (ArcelorMittal  and Firestone),  there is  some evidence that the transparency 
could have been at least fostered to a greater extent. Firstly, there was the official announcement in 
30 See Lockwood et al. (2010: 6), stating that legitimacy also derives from a democratic statute or representation. 
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a public  speech of President  Sirleaf  to  review all  the concessions  made during the transitional 
period, which can be seen as a sign that the process “visibly“ began. Also, because the fast track 
review under  President  Sirleaf  was complementary to  the GEMAP process  (Rosenblum/Maples 
2010: 5), the terms of reference for the review have been adopted. In addition, it has to be said, that 
the narrow relevant actors, like the members of the review committee had access to the original 
contracts for the issue of reappraisal. Also the relevant documents for the advice during the process 
of preparing the review and renegotiation reports were delivered to their technical advisor. But both 
review reports of the IMCCs, including recommendations for the renegotiations have not been made 
public, but accessible to the members and advisor of the committee.
“Like  the  report  by  the  ArcelorMittal  IMCC,  the  report  from  the  Firestone  IMCC,  while  not  
specifically  marked  confidential,  was  viewed  as  a  negotiation  tool  setting  out  the  Government’s 
concerns with the 2005 Concession Agreement and was not a public document“ (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 
7).
This lack of disclosure was explained by the fact, that the „Government and its technical advisor 
felt that negotiations conducted through the press would make it harder if not impossible for the 
Government to reach agreement“ (ibid.). Hence it seems, that at least (ex post) the decision of the 
government was justified.
In  addition,  before  starting  the  renegotiation  with  those  two  companies,  the  priorities  for  the 
negotiations developed by the President have been disclosed to the members of the negotiation team 
and their advisor. 
Also after each renegotiation, the agreement between the Government of Liberia and the company 
was presented in a public hearing in the National Legislature by the negotiation team, which was 
broadcast on radio. This implies that it was possible for the public and relevant stakeholders to 
access  the  content  of  the  agreements.  But  even though the  agreements  with  ArcelorMittal  and 
Firestone are seen as public documents, they are difficult to access in full length, but after request. 
Further,  the  Government  acknowledged  the  importance  of  the  two  renegotiated  contracts  and 
printed the new agreements also on handbills. In addition, the Government released summaries on 
the gains for Liberia after the ratification of the two agreements as shown above, and hence there 
might  be  some  evidence  that  the  disclosure  of  these  summaries  fulfilled  the  criteria  of  a 
comprehensible language and formats for diverse stakeholders. Interestingly, Kaul and Heuty argue, 
there  might  have  been  some  confusion  in  the  Liberian  Government  about  the  obligation  of  a 
subsequent public access to the plain contracts (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 12). However, according to the 
criteria of the quality of the relevant information, the disclosure of the summaries may not be seen 
as complete, but as timely, right after the ratification in the Parliament.
To sum up, after the analysis, there is some evidence that the principle of transparency was fostered, 
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but not in every possible aspect. Especially in accordance to the lack of full and complete disclosure 
of  the  relevant  documents.  Nevertheless,  in  regard  of  the  high  pressure  of  the  Government  to 
achieve significant results after the process, it might be understandable that at some stages of the 
process, especially during the renegotiation,  information was kept confidential.  This goes along 
with the idea, that good practice of transparency is at least an ex post disclosure of the relevant 
documents of the process, which, after this analysis, is suggested31. Also the fact, that the Liberia 
Reconstruction  and  Development  Committee  asked  a  report  team to  monitor  and  evaluate  the 
process (Kaul/Heuty 2009: 2), might be a sign of the practice of the Government's commitment of 
„breaking with corruption“ and the „imperative that the re-opening of these extractive industries is 
rooted in transparency and accountability” (Sirleaf 2007: 2).
Evaluation Of Sharing of Benefits
Now to the aspect of fostering the principle of benefit sharing through the governmental process of 
review and renegotiation  in  Liberia.  In  the amended ArcelorMittal,  as  well  as  in  the  Firestone 
Agreement, there have been achieved several improvements, which can be categorized under the 
term  of  “Benefit  Sharing”.  As  a  matter  of  this  elaboration,  it  will  be  looked  exemplary  at 
preferential hiring patterns to hire local labour and one example of improvement in social services.
One example concerns the circumstances of labour recruitment. In the ArcelorMittal Agreement of 
2006, it was stated that the recruitment of Senior managers have to be within Liberia (Executive 
Mansion Liberia  2006;  Kaul/  Heuty 2009:  102;  Le Billon  2012:  76)  and also in  the Firestone 
agreement it was renegotiated that the unskilled workers have to come from Liberia (Executive 
Mansion  Liberia  2008:  4).  These  both  issues,  which  were  not  restricted  for  Liberians  before 
(Executive Mansion Liberia  2006;  ibid.),  might  support the evidence that  the aspect  of  benefit 
sharing, the preferential hiring of local (Liberian) labour in several positions, is here demonstrated. 
Also in regard to the renegotiated contract of ArcelorMittal, there have been negotiated health care 
obligations for the worker of the company32, whereas in the original contract there have been only 
minimal social obligations (Kaul/ Heuty 2009: 102; Le Billon 2012: 76). 
Also concerning social services, the outcome of the renegotiation process with Firestone determined 
new obligations,  for example towards  education.  Compared to  the old agreement,  including an 
commitment  „to  undertake  a  study  in  coordination  with  the  Government  on  the  need  for  an 
additional  high  school  in  the  Production  Area“  (Executive  Mansion  Liberia  2008:  4)  the  new 
31 See fn.13.
32 As the Government of Liberia, the  Executive Mansion Liberia (2006) states:  „Health and safety facilities, health 
care  procedures  and  practices,  and  health  and  safety  training  to  be  in  accordance  with  accepted  international  
standards“.
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agreement entails the completion and the construction of own company schools through the high 
school level. Also Firestone was also obligated to provide financial assistance for another local high 
school and for an adult education program (ibid.). 
Consequently,  following out of the (limited) analysis  of this  study,  the “Legitimacy and Voice” 
principle might be seen as fostered, even though the lack of formal direct participation through civil  
society actors and NGOs might have weaken it.  Especially due to the significant improvements 
resulting from the two renegotiations with ArcelorMittal and Firestone and the strategy used during 
the process, the consensus orientation seemed to be fostered as well, after this analysis. As shown,  
the transparency could have been also improved, but might not utilized fully, because of the lack of  
complete disclosure. Also, ss just on examples demonstrated, the sharing of benefits principle could 
be advanced in concrete new improvements, concerning issues of hiring local labour and social 
services. Consequently, it could be said, aware of the limited framework here, that the post-conflict  
Liberian  Government  fostered  the  three  principles  of  good  governance  during  the  review  and 
renegotiation process of resource concessions and hence took another step towards building peace. 
3.3 Analysing The Case Of Post- Conflict Democratic Republic Of The Congo
The  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  is  one  of  the  most  resource  rich  states  in  the  world, 
especially in terms of mineral wealth,  but also for example timber.  The great assets of copper, 
coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt, timber, tin also lead to the act, referring to the DRC as a “geological 
scandal”  (NIZA 2006:  6).  But  the  main  population  is  not  profiting  from the  great  Congolese 
resource wealth. In contrast,  the “first African World War” have been taking place in the DRC, 
fuelled by its natural resources (UNEP 2009: 11), and whereon several actors have contributed to 
war, instability and pillaged the country and its resource wealth (ibid.). 
3.3.1 The Congolese Context: Civil War, Conflict Resources And The Way To A Post- Conflict 
State
The first civil war (1996-1997) broke out after several events33 within the Zaire34, and also because 
the  Government  of  Joeseph-Désiré  Mobutu  had  to  deal  with  problems  caused  by  conflicts  in 
neighbouring  countries.  After  the  Genocide  1994  in  Rwanda35 for  example,  over  one  million 
33 For example, there was a devastating economic crisis and a massacre after a  student movement. For a detailed 
analysis of the reasons and background for the outbreak of the civil war, see Nest (2006: 19-24). 
34 Joseph-Désiré Mobutu became president in 1965 and renamed the country in 1971, in Zaire.
35 During the Rwandan genocide 1994, nearly one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed and murdered. In  
Rwanda meanwhile, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) reached “eventual military victory” over 
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refugees  entered  the  DRC which  lead,  among  other  reasons,  to  a  growing  opposition  against 
Mobutu's regime. By the end of 1996, especially external actors were starting attacks against the 
Mobutu  regime.  The  Rwandan  Patriotic  Army (RPA) and  the  Uganda  People's  Defence  Force 
(UPDF), as in the name backed from the Rwandan and Ugandan Governments, constituted together 
the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) against Hutu militias, 
supported by the Zairian National Army (FAZ), the Army of the Congolese president Mobutu. This 
campaign was successful and the AFDL entered Kinshasa in May 1997 and Mobutu fled to Exile in 
Marocco. The head of the AFDL, Lauren-Désiré Kabila, declared himself as the new president and 
renamed Zaire into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Nest 2006: 20-23). In accordance to 
Nest, a major contribution to the success of the AFDL were the revenues generated by selling future 
production concessions of mineral commodities to foreign companies (booty futures). 
Also for the second outbreak of the war (1998-2003), there have been several reasons identified. 
The  Opposition  against  Kabila  started  to  grow  when  external  actors,  like  the  Government  of 
Uganda and Rwanda started a campaign against Kabila after his demand of greater autonomy. Also 
internally, powerful Congolese were unhappy with economic and political reforms (Nest 2006: 24).
In the wake of the second Congolese war, several Congolese, Rwandan, Angolan, Ugandan and 
Zimbabwean militias and rebel groups were fighting on the ground of the DRC for their interests 
(Nest 2006: 24-27). 
In  August  1999,  the  Lusaka  Ceasefire  Agreement  was  signed,  but  first  significant  progress  in 
implementing  this  agreement  could  be  recognized  from  the  beginning  of  2001,  after  Laurent 
Kabila's  death  in  January  2001  (Grignon  2006:  64).  The  Rwandan  and  Ugandan  government 
withdrew their troops and in the concluding session of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD)36,  a 
peace agreement was signed, on the 2nd April 2003 in Sun City. Hence on the basis of Grignon's 
argument, for the aim of this study, at that stage the situation in the DRC might be called 'post-
conflict', but as a matter of this study, the first post-conflict elections marked the end of the conflict  
and transitional period.
The war in the Congo has been called the “first African world war”, especially because of the great 
involvement of external actors and the number of people who got killed: around five million people. 
Although the civil war has officially ended, in the areas of eastern DRC (the Kivus and north-
eastern  Orientale) violence  and  local  conflict  still  remain  (Burnley 2011:  8;  UNEP 2011:  24). 
Around 20 armed groups are still active in armed conflict in these areas. But mainly, these groups  
are  originating  from  neighbour  states  like  Rwanda  (Democratic  Forces  for  the  Liberation  of 
the Hutu militias and hence got into power of the Government (Nest 2006: 20-23).
36 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was organized by the African Union, who appointed the former head of the  
state Sir Ketumile Masire of Botswana as organisor (Grignon 2006: 64, 65).
27
Rwanda,  FDLR)  and  Uganda  (Lord's  Resistance  Army,  LRA  and  the  Allied  Democratic 
Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF, NALU). In addition, several small and 
medium- sized armed groups, like local defence militias (called Mai-Mai) and the Congolese Army 
are also still  involved in  the conflict  and therefore “contribute to high levels of insecurity and 
ongoing conflict” (UNEP 2011: 24). 
The conflict in the DRC is multilayered and complex. “Indeed, it is more correct to talk of Congo 
wars” (Nest 2006: 12). Because several motives, like ethnic, political and (local) grievances, related 
to access to land and resources and the aim of neighbouring countries to maintain their power and 
interests in the DRC (Nest 2006: 31; UNEP 2011: 24). But due to the high exploitation of resources 
and their impact in financing (both) wars, it seemed that the wars have been motivated by greed. 
However,  as  Nest  argues  the  “evidence  suggests,  however,  that  these  actors  initial motives  in 
entering the war were not economic” (Nest 2006: 31).
Nevertheless,  during  both  wars,  several  actors  contributed  to  illegal  exploitation  of  the  DRC's 
natural resource wealth. The UNEP states, that armed groups without an actor financing them have 
to fund their military action from another source. Consequently,  this includes natural resources, 
which can be easily plundered.  In the DRC, the conflicts between 1996-1997, 1998-2003 were 
fuelled by the resources copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt, timber, tin (UNEP 2009: 11). Also 
Ross is supporting the argument by the evidence, that in his categorized second Congolese war37, 
the resource wealth lengthen the conflict in giving combatants an economic incentive to avoid or 
sign a peace agreement (Ross 2004: 53).
The connection between actors plundering natural resources and the conflicts in the DRC has been 
widely acknowledged, also at a high political level. The UNSC for example, established an UN 
Panel of Experts to elaborate the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth 
of the DRC (UNSC 2000b). In accordance to their report, nearly all mining sites in the Kivus are 
controlled by armed forces. This military resource extraction is exercised by national and foreign 
militias and also the Congolese army units (FARDC) (UNEP 2011: 24; Burnley 2011:7). Also, the 
decision of the Ugandan and Rwandan Government to involve in the DRC, was formed (partly) by 
the prospect of generated revenue of DRC's natural resources. As the UNSC (2001a: 6, 7) suggests, 
for example the Rwandan army built an efficient system to exploit DRC's natural resources in order 
to fund their military operation. Highly significant for the funding, was also the practice of the 
actors  involved  in  the  DRC,  as  the  UNSC (2010)  states  „that  the  linkage  between  the  illicit 
exploitation and trade of natural resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms is among the 
37 Ross (2004: 48) categorized the duration of the first civil war in the DRC in the year 1996 and the second civil war 
between 1997 and 1999.
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major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region“ (UNSC 2010: 2; UNEP 
2011:  24,  25).  Furthermore,  the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in  the DRC 
(MONUSCO) has, beside the mission in Liberia, the only clear mandate for post- conflict natural 
resource  management38,  recognizing  “the  urgent  need to  fight  illegal  exploitation  and trade  of, 
natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, support the Government’s efforts and 
enhance its capabilities” (UNSC 2010: 6). 
3.3.2 The Post- Conflict Governmental Review, Renegotiation And Cancellation Process Of 
Natural Resource Concessions
After briefly outlining the background of the DRC, and how the civil war was connected to natural 
resources, in the following the governmental reappraisal process of resource concessions in post-
conflict DRC will be demonstrated. 
The Review Process 
As in the section regarding the case of Liberia, the focus here is on the renegotiation process of  
resource concessions, exercised by the post- conflict elected and legitimate government (Kabemba 
2008). After the elections, and the establishment of a government under Jospeh Kabila in February 
2007 (Cater Center 2007: 2), the Ministry of Mines announced in April of 2007 to review mining 
contracts (Global Witness 2007: 4). The new elected President and Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga 
developed a „Governance Contract“, outlining and positioning the main aims and goals of the new 
government. This “Contract”, also implied attempts to foster transparency in the mining sector and 
to renegotiate, if necessary, existing mining agreements. This happened under high international 
pressure, especially from the World Bank and the European Commission supporting the formulation 
of  the  Governance  Contract  in  accordance  to  the  World  Banks  Poverty  reduction  and  Growth 
Strategy Paper (Carter Center 2007: 2). In addition, already several other actors, like NGOs and a 
parliamentary  Commission  before  (Lutundula  Commission)39 raised  several  concerns  with  the 
existing mining agreements (Carter Center 2007:1; Kabemba 2008: 6)
Hence,  the Congolese Government started a review process for the existing resource concessions. 
38 See UN (n.d.): Conflict and resources; URL: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/environment/resources.shtml, 03.12.2015.
39 The Lutundula Commission was created in 2005 as a parliamentary Commission of the transitional Government.  
Lutundula was a member of the opposition in government and was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission.  
In June 2005, a final report was submitted to the Bureau of the National Assembly, concluding that from the selected 
63 Mining contracts signed between 1996-2003 and object to review, the majority of contracts were illegal and had  
contributed  little  or  nothing  to  the  development  of  the  county.  The  report  included  recommendations  for  
renegotiation and cancellation of contracts, but the parliament of transition never discussed the result of the report 
(Kabemba 2008: 7; Lukanda 2014: 347, fn. 240).
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According to Kabemba and Lukanda sixty-three40 mining contracts were identified for the review 
process (Kabemba 2008:  6;  Lukanda 2014: 347),  according to  the criteria,  that  they have been 
signed during the two civil wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) and during the transitional period 
(2003-2006) (Carter Center 2007 ; Kabemba 2008; Le Billon 2012; Lukanda 2014: 347).
These companies were mainly junior companies or individuals with no great experience in mining 
(Kabemba 2008: 6). Especially it was claimed, that there is a huge imbalance of what the (private) 
companies are benefiting out of existing contracts, in contrast to the government of the DRC. One 
example is the state own enterprise Gécamines, which once controlled nearly the whole industry 
and now has just minority positions in private mining projects (ibid.). 
The interministerial Commission for the review of mining contracts (Revisitation Commission) was 
officially launched by the Minister of Mines, Martin Kabewelulu in April 2007 (Carter Center 2007: 
2; Global Witness 2007:4)41. As Global Witness stated, this announcement „is one of the few official 
documents on this issue which is widely available“ (Global Witness 2007: 4). The Commission 
started working in June 2007, with a working mandate of three month. The Commission had a  
plenary, with all the members and the chairman, and three sub- commissions, each examining a 
proportion of contracts for review42 (ibid.). The objectives of the Commission, stated in the decree, 
were to review the „partnership contracts  concluded by the state and or public companies with 
private investors in the mining sector and assess their impact on the DRC's public companies and 
national development” (Lukanda 2014: 348). In addition, the Commission was supposed to deliver 
recommendations for terms and conditions under which the contracts should be renegotiated in 
order  to  correct  imbalances  (Kabemba  2008:  9,  Lukanda  2014:  348,  349).  The  nature  of  the 
Revisitation Commission had no legal status, but corresponded with an ad hoc technical structure, 
was answerable and reported to the Ministry of Mines (Global Witness 2007: 5; Kabemba 2008: 9). 
The Commission was constituted of 28 members of the government and civil service, including 
representatives from the presidency and diverse ministries like the Ministry of Mines providing the 
Chairman by his Principal private Secretary (Directeur de Cabinet) (Carter Center 2007: 13; Global 
Witness 2007: 5; Kabemba 2008: 9)43. The criteria or terms of reference for the review process have 
40 It  seems that there is a lack of clarity about the amount of contracts reviewed. Global Witness for example, is 
speaking of 60 contracts which have been listed from the Ministry of Mines, and complained, it was assumed this  
would be the complete list of contracts for review. But the list merely suggests, that these 60 contracts, have been 
only the contracts which have been submitted to the office of the Minister of Mines, hence, it is not a complete, nor 
definite list (Global Witness 2007: 8). Le Billon in contrast, speaks about 61 contracts, which have been issue of the 
review commission (Le Billon 2012: 79). As a matter of this study, the reviewed contracts by the Commission are 
determined as 63 contracts, referring to the information of Lukanda and Kabemba.
41 The Minister of Mines signed the Memorandum for the revision of mining contracts and the commission was itself  
created on the 20 April 2007. It included the timeframe of three months to complete the work --from the 15 th of May 
to the 15th of July 2007 (Kabemba 2008: 9). 
42 For more details of the Commission's day-to day- work, see Global Witness (2007: 5).
43 In Detail: The Directeur de Cabinet (Principal Private Secretary); 2 advisor from the ministry of mines; 2 delegates 
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not been made public, after the Commission began its work. Accordingly, Global Witness pointed 
out,  that  even  though  these  term  of  reference  are  not  confidential,  not  the  criteria44 and  the 
methodology, nor the plan for the review process have been made public45.
“The Revisitation Commission’s report,  completed in November 2007 but not publicly released 
until March 2008” (Le Billon 2012: 79), categorised the reviewed mining agreements into three 
sections. Category A constituted the category of those arrangements, which can remain unchanged, 
category B embraced those contracts, which would require renegotiation and category C stood for 
the cancellation of contracts. Not a single agreement was listed in category A, 40 contracts were put 
into category B (Lukanda 2014: 350), and 23 mining agreements into category C (Le Billon 2012: 
79;  Lukanda  2014:  350).  In  the  Commission's  report,  there  was  no  guideline  or  outline  and 
recommendations for the future renegotiation of contracts included46. Also no reference has been 
made to acts  of illegality and consequent disclosure to relevant judicial  bodies (Lukanda 2014: 
351).  “As of  writing this  article  [published in  2014] there had been no disclosure on how the 
Commission chose these agreements and if the process of auditing them include any prioritization“ 
(ibid.: 350). According to this aspect, the Directeur de Cabinet stated to Global Witness, that there 
have been some priorities for the review of certain contracts, starting with „the biggest“ (Global 
Witness  2007:  8).  What  exactly  this  would  mean,  understanding  „the  biggest“  for  example  in 
financial terms, or those with the most serious problems remain unspecified and unclear (ibid.). 
The  decree  for  the  establishment  of  the  Commission  stated  that  external  advice  was  allowed, 
without  defining  any  details  (Global  Witness  2007:  13;  Lukanda  2014:  349).  Further,  the 
Commission asked several actors,  like the non-profit  organizations Carter Center  and the Open 
Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), and the Benjamin Rothschild Bank to accompany 
representatives  from the  Presidency;  2  delegates  from the  prime  Minister’s  office;  2  delegates  from  Ministry 
Finance; 2 delegates from Ministry in Charge of the Budget; 2 delegates from Ministry Justice; 2 delegates from 
Ministry without Portfolio; 2 delegates from Ministry in charge of Industry; 4 delegates from General Secretary of  
Mines ; 4 delegates from Cadastre Minier; 4 delegates from technical institutions, see Kabemba (2008: 9).
44 However, Global Witness requested a copy from the Ministry of Mines and received draft version in comparison to 
other observers in August 2007 (Global Witness 2007: 5): „1. the distribution of share capital within joint-venture 
companies, 2. The breakdown of the allocation of revenues from joint venture companies, 3. Respect of the social 
clause, 4. The disempowerment of statutory management bodies of the joint- venture company in favour of the  
operating company, the subsidiary of the majority partner, 5. The confidentiality clause with respect to the principles 
of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative“ (Global Witness 2007: 6). 
45 Global Witness also requested the plan or methodology for the process and received one. The methodology was 
structured into three phases, embracing first the collection of information of the contracts, infrastructure, production 
and the social clause, second the definition of terms of reference, examining the legality of the contracts, the context  
of signing and the financial balance between the parties and third an analysis of the contract itself (ibid.). 
46 “At the end of October  [2007, one week before the Report was submitted to the government], members of the 
Commission leaked a chart from the report. The chart classified all of the contracts as requiring renegotiation or  
termination; none of the contracts were deemed sufficient to be left 'as is'. Commission members reportedly released 
this chart because they feared that their conclusions might be altered in the subsequent political process. It appears  
likely that the leaked document does represent the actual Commission recommendations as to disposition of the 
contracts that they analysed“ (Carter Center 2007: 5).
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the process. According to the Carter Center, OSISA gave some direct support to the Commission, 
especially in mobilizing civil society experts to exercise an own independent review. In contrast, 
according to the Ministry of Mines,  the Benjamin Rothschild Bank stepped out of the process,  
because they could not deliver pro bono advice (Carter Center 2007: 3). But there has been some 
confusion about the exact role of these actors in the process, especially about the relationship with 
the Rothschild Bank47. 
In  addition,  because  of  the  short  timeframe,  the  Directeur  de  Cabinet pronounced  to  Global 
Witness, that if the required advice would be not available at the time needed, the Commission 
would not take the external advice into account for their considerations (Global Witness 2007: 14). 
He also made clear, that the work of the Commission is a governmental process, which is not bound 
to the recommendations and exercises of other organisations (ibid.). 
But the Commission invited five organisations48 to take in an observer role in the process. The 
observers  were  appointed  one  month  after  the  start  of  the  Commission's  work.  However,  it  is  
unclear due to what criteria these organizations have been chosen and which defined formal role 
they had in the process. The observers were allowed to participate and make comments in the sub- 
commissions and their sessions. But they were not allowed to participate in the plenary sessions, in 
those the reports got adopted, nor had they any documents or (previous) contracts in advance for 
preparation,  only  after  request  (Global  Witness  2007:  16).  Though,  the  attendance  of  these 
organisations have not been continuously, in contrast, only FEC and ANEP have been „the most 
conscientious, both in terms of attendance and participation“ (ibid.). 
Affected communities living in the mining areas were not integrated in the review process of the 
Commission (Lukanda 2014: 350). Also the Revisitation Commission had limited financial support 
and budget from foreign donors, only Belgium provided significant funding (about US$100,000) 
for legal advice through the Carter Center (Le Billon 2012: 79). 
The Renegotiation Process 
“Unlike  the  preceding  stage,  the  Congolese  government  has  disclosed  the  terms  of  reference 
applicable  to  the  task  force  that  proceeded  with  the  renegotiation  and  cancellation  of  mining 
47 “However,  very  little  public  information  is  available  on  its  [the  Benjamin  Rothschild  Bank]  role  or  official 
relationship with the government- if any- in the context of this review“ (Global Witness 2007: 14). The Bank itself  
stated to Global Witness, that nor the DRC or any public entity of the DRC gave them a mandate for the review of 
financial aspects of the mining contracts (ibid.). 
48 The five organisations invited: the Centre d'études pourl l'action sociale (CEPAS, a Jesuit research institute focusing 
on social  issues),  the  Conférence Episcopale nationale du Congo (CENCO, National Bishop's Conference),  the 
Fédération des Entreprises Congolaises (FEC, Federation of Conogolese Enterprises), the  Association Nationale  
des Entreprises du Portefeuille (ANEP, National Association of Public Companies) and Avocats Verts, an 'activist' 
(Lukanda 2014: 350) NGO working for environmental protection and rights of human communities (Global Witness 
2007: 15, 16). 
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agreements“  (Lukanda  2014:  351).  These  terms  embrace  15  aspects,  whereas  14  aspects  are 
focusing on the renegotiation. This guideline stresses especially the importance of adjustments of 
financial  and management aspects of the mining agreements for the Congolese Government.  In 
contrast, the terms of reference entail no conditions for social or environmental standards of mining 
operations. 
In September 2008, the Government appointed a task force for entering into renegotiations with 
those  companies,  classified for negotiation after the review. But the  appointed team also started 
renegotiation with some partnerships, whose agreements should have been cancelled, in regard of 
the Commission's report. Why and due to what reason and justification is unclear (Lukanda 2014: 
356). As  the  Carter  Center  (2009)  states,  after  „months  of  silence,  the  government  turned 
precipitously to renegotiations without independent financial or legal expertise“. 
During the following month,  the parastatal  mining companies renegotiated agreements with the 
majority of those companies,  subject  to  the review process.  However, with the most  important 
economic  actors,  like  Tenke  Fugurume  (Freeport  McMoRan)  and  First  Quantum no  amended 
agreement was reached. „When Minister Kabwelulu declared the end of the review, he indicated 
that contracts  with those companies would remain largely unchanged“ (Carter Center 2009). In 
contrast,  Lukanda  reported, that with five out of the six important economic actors (AngoGold, 
Ashanti, Banro, FirstQuantum, FreeportMcMoRan, Gold Fields and Mwana Africa) an agreement 
was reached, except with FirstQuantum which's contract was cancelled later (Lukanda 2014: 356). 
Several companies accepted the aim of the government to renegotiate existing agreements, but to a 
lesser degree than formulated in the terms of reference (ibid.). However, the Congolese government 
did reach some improvements compared to the original agreements. The Government achieved an 
increase in the state owned enterprise share in partnerships, from less than 20 percent to about 30 
percent, the integration of representatives of the state owned companies at the level of management 
of the partnership and an increase in the amount of transfer bonus and royalties (Lukanda 2014: 
356).  After the process of renegotiation, some contracts have been disclosed by the Ministry of 
Mines49. 
3.3.3 Evaluation Of The Impact Of Resource Concessions For Good Governance
Evaluation Of Legitimacy
Now to the evaluation of the principle legitimacy in the review process of the DRC.
The Commission with the task to review and renegotiate was interministerial and the members were 
49 Ministry  of  Mine,  DRC  (n.d.):  Les  Contrats  Minier.  Après  la  Revisitation.  URL: 
http://minesrdc.cd/fr/index.php/contrats-des-ressources-naturelles/contrats-miniers, 09.12.2015.
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appointed by the Ministry of Mines. Hence, it seems there has been indirect participation through 
members  of  the government,  which  have been elected.  Therefore it  could be  assumed that  the 
members of the Committee are representing the intentions „of all men and women“. But in regard 
of the members of the Commission, the review process has been target of criticism. For example, it 
was claimed the Commission was set up of individuals from government ministries, which lacked 
of  demanded  control  against  political  influence  and  the  necessary  expertise  required  for  the 
complex review process.  Also after the election,  individuals who strongly profited from former 
mining deals became members of the new government (Global Witness 2007: 11; Kabemba 2008: 
11).  According  to  this  argument  it  should  be  questionable  whether  (all)  the  members  of  the 
Commission have maintained their integrity50 and represented the intentions of the population and 
influenced the decision-making in their interest. But nevertheless, in the framework of this analysis, 
it was not possible to find evidence for this argument, in contrary, here the assumption implied that 
elected representatives perform according to the intention of the people, in accordance to Kabemba 
(2008: 11). 
In  the  review  process  of  the  DRC,  also  observers  from  the  civil  society  were  allowed.  But 
especially, regarding the late appointment of the observers, the lack of possibilities of participation 
in  the  plenary  and  the  lack  of  clarity  of  their  role  allows  some  evidence  that  „in  practice, 
opportunities for Congolese NGOs to provide meaningful input into the process have been limited“ 
(Global  Witness  2007:  17).  The  Government  did  not  explain  why choosing exactly  those  five 
observers and the (late) information provided for a constructive participation of the observers has 
been missing51. Hence it seems here, like the participation of NGOs has been more a superficial one. 
Now to the aspect of consensus orientation of the review and negotiation process in the DRC. How 
the decision were made in the review process or what strategy was used in the renegotiations is not 
known. Therefore, only the outcome of the review and renegotiation process could be evaluated in 
this  work.  The study here might suggest the argument,  that the recommendations,  or better  the 
categories  built  for  the  resource  concessions  agreements  had  not  been  (fully)  followed  in  the 
renegotiations. Lukanda also states, that there is some evidence, although agreements have been put 
in the category “cancelled”, they have been renegotiated. Hence, this is one factor which might 
suggest,  that the renegotiation process might not have been in the best interest  of the DRC. In 
addition, the outcome of the renegotiated contracts was difficult to analyse in the framework of this 
study, due to a lack of contracts and information disclosed. But according to the scholar Lukanda, 
50 “Legitimacy also requires  that  governing actors  exercise their  authority with integrity,  in  that  they declare any 
conflicts  of  interest,  do  not  seek  to  manipulate  outcomes  to  their  personal  advantage,  and  behave  honestly”  
(Lockwood et al. 2010: 7).
51 See also Section 3.1 for the principle of transparency, pp.14,15.
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only some adjustments, an increase in the partnership share of state owned companies and some 
short  term  gains  have  been  reached.  Therefore,  the  here  made  examination  ascertain  some 
improvements to the agreements before, which is embedded in „fostering“. On the other hand, the 
process in the DRC could be further seen as “missed opportunities” (Carter Center 2009) for a 
better result and therefore leads to the assumption, that the principle of legitimacy could have been 
at least fostered on a larger scale. This direction of the findings is also similar to the judgement of 
John Stremlau, Vice president for Peace Programs of The Carter Center: "At critical moments, the 
government chose to forgo international cooperation and transparent procedures. This undermined 
both the legitimacy of the process and any confidence in the outcome" (Carter Center 2009). 
Evaluation Of Transparency
In the case of the DRC review process, there has been an official announcement of the process, 
which can be seen as the Commission made the process „visible“. But neither the criteria nor the 
terms of reference for the review process have been made public after the Commission began its 
work. Only after request, the terms of reference have been made (selective) available, like to Global 
Witness.  This  might  be  a  sign,  that  the  process  could  not  be  evaluated  as  predictable  or 
understandable,  due  to  the  lack  of  disclosing  rules  or  plans.  But  after  the  review process,  the 
resulting Report of the Committee has been made public in March 2008. However, this final report 
has been made accessible, after quite a long period. Due to the fact, that the Commission ended the 
review process by mid July 2007. Hence, in regard of this relevant information, the release of the 
document might not be described as timely. Concerning the review process, the Commission invited 
(after the start of the process) several organisations as observers, but they did not have access to the 
relevant documents in advance, like the original contracts which are subject to the process, only 
after request they received a copy. 
The  renegotiation  process  started  with  the  disclosure  of  the  terms  of  reference  for  the 
renegotiations. But as mentioned above, also contracts have been renegotiated which were put in the 
category of “cancelled” in the review report. Hence, neither was the decision to renegotiate instead 
of cancellation explained,  nor  might  the renegotiation process be described as  transparent.  The 
appointed task force reached new agreements with the companies, but only selected agreements has 
been plainly made (only in French) public on the Website of the Ministry of Mines, without a  
statement of the selection. Therefore, the selective disclosure of information might not be seen as 
complete, and consequently the process as understandable. 
As a result from the here analysed aspects, the evidence suggests that even though some relevant 
information have been made public, and hence transparency could been fostered, on the other hand 
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the lack of clarity of selective disclosure of relevant documents and the time delay, might make it 
difficult to describe the process as fostering transparency in a significant way. 
Evaluation Of Benefit Sharing
Now to  the  advancement  of  the  principle  benefit  sharing  in  the  DRC's  reappraisal  process  of 
resource concessions. Due to the limited framework of this analysis, it was nearly impossible to 
examine the improvements made, classified as sharing of benefits. Because neither all the contracts 
have  been  published  (and  if,  only  in  French),  nor  a  similar  “Summary  of  the  Gains”  of  the 
renegotiations, like in was the case in Liberia, have been published in English (or French), it is 
difficult  to  analyse  possible  improvements  under  the  term of  benefit  sharing.  Only  it  can  be 
assumed, that as shown above, already in the terms of reference for the renegotiation process there 
have not been a focus on increasing social and environmental standards and mentioning parts of 
benefit sharing. Therefore, on the basis of the evaluations of other scholars, it was said that the 
renegotiation process merely brought (tiny) adjustments in the contracts and hence, a significant 
advancement of sharing of benefits might not have been achieved.
As shown for the case of the DRC, the evaluation of the review and renegotiation process was 
partly  difficult.  The  principle  of  legitimacy,  might  be  seen  as  fostered,  due  to  the  indirect 
participation guaranteed through the elected Commission members and direct participation through 
the attendance of observers. But, as demonstrated previously, several concerns and criticism about 
the integrity of the members,  the constrained practical impact of the observers in the decision- 
making process and the limited outcome of renegotiations might at least confine the extent to what 
legitimacy  could  been  fostered  in  the  reappraisal  process.  Also  regarding  to  the  principle  of 
transparency, the results of this analysis are mixed. The Government started the process visibly, and 
also the disclosure of the report of review and (some) plain contracts might advanced transparency. 
On the other hand, the lack of complete and timely disclosure of other relevant information, the 
existence  of  several  uncertainties,  for  example  about  the  crucial  information  of  the  amount  of 
contracts reviewed and the selective, unexplained release of information might have weaken the 
promotion of transparency to quite a great extent. In addition, the principle of benefit sharing, could 
not been (sufficiently) analysed due to the lack of provided information and publication. As a result,  
the reappraisal process of resource concessions in the DRC might have fostered the principles to 
some extent,  but simultaneously limited the advancement of good governance,  regarding to the 
above discussed factors. 
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4. Conclusion: Management Of Resource Concessions As A Mean To Foster Good 
Governance And Peacebuilding. Comparing The Two Cases Of Post- Conflict 
Liberia And The Democratic Republic Of The Congo
This study was analysing the question to what extent the management of resource concessions, here 
the process of review and renegotiation of such, was fostering good governance in post- conflict 
Liberia and the DRC. First the debates in the literature around peacebuilding, good governance and 
the natural resource management has been outlined and key concepts, such as conflict resources 
defined.  Hence  as  demonstrated,  the  advancement  of  good  governance  in  managing  natural 
resources in post-conflict environments might be seen as one part of overcoming the paradox of the 
resource curse. Further, the three principles of legitimacy, transparency and sharing of benefits have 
been in the centre of the analysis. These aspects have been defined and adopted for the purpose of 
this study in the context of PCNRM. The reappraisal and renegotiation thus is representing one part  
of  PCNRM, and resource  concession management  as  a  mean to  (re-)establish  aspects  of  good 
governance  and  furthermore  rebuilt  trust  in  the  post-conflict  government.  These  processes  are 
understood as a tool to maximise the revenues out of these concessions, renegotiate unfair contracts 
and generally advance the benefits for the people of the resource wealth of their states. 
In this study, the review and renegotiation process of post- conflict Liberia and the DRC have been 
selected as case studies, concentrating on the governmental process. Both states, Liberia and the 
DRC  are  wealthy  in  terms  of  natural  resources,  which  could  be  the  basis  of  prosperity  and 
development.  But  as  shown, conflict  resources instead  fuelled  wars  in  both  countries,  natural 
resources have been target of corruption and the main population have not been benefiting from 
their country's resource wealth. In addition in the year 2003, Liberia and the DRC signed peace 
agreements, under strong international pressure and support. In each case, this was followed by 
first, a Transitional Government while the national and international efforts prepared post-conflict 
elections. Linked to the growing awareness in the literature that a „good“ management of resources 
of war- torn states could be a main factor for long- lasting peace. Also the review of concessions 
and renegotiation can contribute to peacebuilding and good governance. As demonstrated, both new 
elected Presidents, Ellen Sirleaf in Liberia and Joseph Kabila in the DRC launched to review and 
renegotiate concessions awarded during civil war and/ or the transitional period. Hence, it seems, 
after  recapturing the background of the civil  war and resources,  the two cases have been quite 
similar. 
In awareness of the limited framework of this work, the results to what extent Liberia and the DRC 
were  fostering  the  here  focused on three  principles  of  legitimacy,  transparency and  sharing  of 
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benefits have been quite different. While it seems, that in Liberia especially the legitimacy was 
fostered through the significant outcome and improvements for Liberia in comparison to the old 
contracts,  the legitimacy of the process  in  the DRC might  be evaluated as more critical.  Even 
though, there has been for example, a formal invitation for some civil society actors to observe the 
process,  the  evidence  suggests,  however,  after  this  analysis  that  the  actual  impact  of  direct 
participation has not been that high and might have been superficial. In addition, the outcome and 
consensus orientation during the process in the DRC, as well as in the results are weaker than the  
improvements  made  in  Liberia.  Also  problematically,  the  amendments  through  the  reappraisal 
process partly not could have been analysed in the case of the DRC.
In regard of the principle of transparency, the here analysed aspects suggests, that in both cases the 
transparency at  least could be higher.  Even though the transparency, as defined above, was not 
fulfilled completely,  there probably have been made some progress compared to the practice of 
disclosure of information before. Whereas in the case of Liberia, some relevant documents have 
been kept confidential through the process, at least with reasoning this decision, in the case of the 
DRC only selected information have been made public, without explanation. This relates especially 
to the existing lack of justification for renegotiating contracts which should have been cancelled and 
the aspect of not implementing the proposed recommendations through the review process.
When it comes to the comparison concerning the aspect of benefit sharing, it is difficult to come to 
a  conclusion.  As  shown  above,  the  Liberian  government  achieved  (relatively)  great  successes 
through  the  renegotiation  process  and  hence  also  reached  gains  under  the  principle  of  benefit 
sharing.  Due  to  the  lack  or  selective  disclosure  of  the  relevant  information  provided  by  the 
government of the DRC and the here limited framework of analysis, it was on the other hand nearly 
not possible to examine this issue for the DRC. Nevertheless, as shown above, there have been 
reached  some  improvements  after  the  renegotiations,  but  mainly  economic  gains.  The  DRC's 
priorities and aims for renegotiation are not mentioning social or environmental obligations, and 
therefore it might be reasonable to assume, that the principle of benefit sharing could not have been 
fostered. 
Consequently, it was shown, that the two cases have been quite similar but with different outcomes 
in  fostering aspects  of  good governance  as  a  peacebuilding dimension through the  review and 
reappraisal process of resource concessions. But interestingly, whereas the process in Liberia widely 
has been seen as a relative success, the government of the DRC based on this analysis could not 
show serious efforts towards good governance and may make it more difficult in the future for a 
long-lasting peace. 
One constrain of the analysis focusing on the governmental process, however, might have been that 
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in  the  case  of  Liberia  the  Government  „only“  exercised  the  review  and  renegotiation  of  two 
concessions  independently.  The  remained  resource  concessions  have  been  issue  of  the 
internationally supported GEMAP reappraisal process. Consequently, the broader framework of the 
DRC's reappraisal process of all concessions awarded during civil war and the transitional period 
might be understood as more demanding and therefore might determine the weaker result. On the 
other  hand,  as  explained  previously,  the  efforts  of  the  Congolese  Government  to  include 
international actors and support, like Liberia, could be described as limited.
So in regard to the results of this elaboration, post-conflict Liberia could fostered good governance 
through the reappraisal process of concessions to a greater extent than the case of post-conflict 
DRC. The scholars Kaul and Heuty (2009: 51) identified factors why the fast  track process in 
Liberia lead to relative successful renegotiations and thus created new benefits for the Liberian 
people: First, the strong will and leadership of Sirleaf in managing the renegotiation process and the 
establishment  of  a direct  reporting line between the negotiation team and the decision makers, 
second, the strategy used in the renegotiation based on consensus- building and third, the resources 
and  capacities  available  linked  to  the  „world-class“  advisor  and  therefore  expertise  (ibid.). 
Interestingly,  if  briefly looking at  the  case of  the  DRC, after  this  analysis,  the  findings  might  
suggests, that these factors were not, or at least weakly included in the review and renegotiation 
process of  the DRC. Neither  might  a strong leadership of the President  recognized or  a direct 
accountability  and  reporting  manner,  nor  has  there  been  significant  external  expertise  or  an 
agreement  on  a  clear  consensus  strategy.  For  analytical  reasons,  it  was  not  possible  to  deeply 
appraise this argument, but it might be an interesting question for future research. 
Even  though,  each  post-conflict  state  and  dynamics  are  different,  and  hence  also  the  resource 
concession management should be understood in the state's context, it could be interesting, if also 
external factors, like a „worldclass“ expertise, could provide one aspect for success. 
Due to the fact, that at least 40% of the civil wars in the last sixty years have been connected to 
natural resources, there might be the need to draw lessons and develop guidelines, to support other 
post-  conflict  states  managing  their  natural  resources  and  reappraise  and  renegotiate  resource 
concessions. Even though, it is representing just one aspect of peacebuilding related to a manner of 
good governance in post-conflict natural resource management, it might constitute one part of the 
chance towards a long-lasting peace. 
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